Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Theses

5-2017

Bad Behavior with Good Intentions: The Role of
Organizational Climate in Unethical ProOrganizational Behavior
Emily A. Burnett
Clemson University, easulli@g.clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Recommended Citation
Burnett, Emily A., "Bad Behavior with Good Intentions: The Role of Organizational Climate in Unethical Pro-Organizational
Behavior" (2017). All Theses. 2608.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/2608

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

Theses

BAD BEHAVIOR WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
CLIMATE IN UNETHICAL PRO-ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Applied Psychology

by
Emily A. Burnett
May 2017

Accepted by:
Dr. Cynthia L. S. Pury, Committee Chair
Dr. Fred S. Switzer, III
Dr. DeWayne Moore
Dr. Robin M. Kowalski

ABSTRACT

Unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) occurs when employees engage in
unethical actions for the purpose of benefiting their organization. UPB shares antecedents
with counterproductive work behavior, but also with organizational citizenship behavior.
In order to explain UPB’s unique combination of antecedents, this study examined the
opposing motivational mechanisms behind UPB: organizational concern and ethical
sensitivity. This study’s central focus was to empirically substantiate the conflicting
positive and negative effects of ethical climate on UPB, demonstrating support for
organizational climate theory and UPB theory.
Perceptions of ethical climate and goals climate (operationalized at the
department level) were used to show the effect of environmental factors on UPB.
Individuals’ organizational identification, moral potency, and ethical ideology were
included to demonstrate the effect of individual attributes on UPB. To accurately
represent the complex relationships between these factors and UPB, structural equation
modeling was used to create a single interconnected model. Survey responses were
collected online from 400 participants from a wide variety of organizations.
Ethical climate was found to decrease department-wide UPB and individuals’
willingness towards UPB through direct effects, but increased individuals’ willingness
towards UPB through a mediation effect involving organizational identification. The
direct effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB was curvilinear, such that only highly
ethical climates exerted an appreciable direct negative effect on individuals’ UPB. The
total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB resulted in an inverse U-shaped
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relationship. Ethical climate and goals climate interacted to influence individuals’
willingness towards UPB: goals climate increased individuals’ UPB when ethical climate
was high and decreased individuals’ UPB when ethical climate was low. Moral potency
demonstrated the single largest direct effect and the largest total effect on individuals’
UPB, drastically reducing individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Individuals’
idealistic ethical ideology also decreased individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The
results of this study advance UPB and organizational climate research by deconstructing
the multifaceted relationship between ethical climate and UPB and also by demonstrating
the effect of multiple climates interacting to predict UPB. This study was also the first to
identify moral potency as a powerful influencing factor on UPB.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Concern over unethical business practices has grown increasingly salient in recent
years as reports of employees prioritizing profits over morals become more frequent.
From the Enron scandal that precipitated the financial crisis to the recent revelation of
Volkswagen’s rigged emissions systems, countless examples exist of employees who will
stop at nothing to help their company succeed, even at the expense of harming bystanders
in the process. Organizations must find effective strategies to prevent these harmful
business practices, not only to uphold their ethical responsibility to their customers and
community, but also to protect themselves from the legal liability and reputation damages
organizations often suffer when these unethical practices are uncovered (Pierce &
Aguinis, 2013).
Enron and Volkswagen serve as examples of the potential consequences of
actions employees take with company benefit in mind. A core group of Enron’s
executives prioritized stock price and company profits above all else, and the eventual
result was the largest bankruptcy in American history at the time (Bratton, 2012). The
total economic loss associated with Enron’s collapse was in the tens of billions, mostly
borne by shareholders and employees, but also felt by the American economy at large. In
a more recent instance, an unknown number of Volkswagen engineers designed a device
to allow Volkswagen’s diesel engines to pass emissions inspections while still emitting
up to 40 times the legal limit of pollutants (Chappell, 2015). This allowed Volkswagen’s
diesel vehicles to outperform their competitors in cost efficiency and horsepower,
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increasing Volkswagen’s sales and stock value. Within two weeks of the discovery of this
fraud, Volkswagen stock lost 30 percent of its former value and posted an annual net loss
for the first time in 15 years (Chew, 2015). Furthermore, one cannot understate the
environmental and public health consequences of the estimated 1 million tons of excess
pollutants caused by Volkswagen’s fraud (Mathiesen & Neslen, 2015).
While these extreme cases are relatively rare, smaller versions of similar behavior
are common in many parts of the business sector. From a salesperson overstating the
effectiveness of a product to drive sales to a manager rushing through food safety
procedures to maintain the production schedule, the pressures of achieving company
goals often lead to sacrifices in ethicality. Even with these smaller transgressions, the
potential consequences to the victims and to the company generally outweigh any
company profit gained by the actions. The most egregious pro-organizational ethical
breaches, like those in Enron and Volkswagen, occur relatively infrequently; as such,
they are likely to be a statistical improbability for any one organization. Despite this, the
severity of the potential consequences of such an occurrence are so great that it would be
irresponsible not to treat these behaviors as a serious threat.
A bourgeoning body of research strives to understand the individual and
situational risk factors of immoral pro-organizational behaviors in order to provide
organizations with the tools necessary to discourage these behaviors in the workplace.
Although studied under many different names, the term unethical pro-organizational
behavior (UPB) has emerged as an umbrella concept to connect all the separate areas of
literature (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). UPB is defined as “actions that are intended to
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promote the effective functioning of the organization or its members (e.g., leaders) and
violate core societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” (Umphress &
Bingham, 2011, p. 622).
This proposal will first offer an examination of UPB as a scientific construct. I
will (1) review the conceptual definition of UPB, considering many taxonomies of
workplace behavior to delineate UPB’s key defining features. I will then present the
current understanding of UPB in the scientific literature by (2) reviewing the empirical
research on UPB and (3) discussing the theoretical frameworks that have been used to
explain UPB.
Next, I will propose my current study as the most effective way to advance UPB
research, offering theoretical and empirical evidence to support my assertion. I will (4)
suggest an under-examined predictor of UPB, organizational climate, as the next logical
focus of UPB research. Integrating organizational climate theory and UPB research, I will
offer my predictions for how organizational climate affects UPB. I will then (5) introduce
two individual characteristics that I predict will moderate the relationship between
organizational climate and UPB: ethical ideology and moral potency. My goal in this
proposed study is to not only determine the direct relationship between organizational
climate and UPB, but also to understand the nature of the relationship between climate
and UPB while considering several moderating and mediating factors.

3

Defining Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior
Intent to benefit the organization.
Vardi and Wiener (1996) made a major contribution to UPB theory by
categorizing employee misbehavior based on the intentions behind the behavior; this
separates counterproductive work behavior (CWB) from UPB. They introduced the
construct of organizational misbehavior (OMB), which they defined as “any intentional
action by members of organizations that defies and violates (1) shared organizational
norms and expectations, and/or (2) core societal values, mores and standards of proper
conduct” (Vardi & Wiener, 1996, p. 153). These researchers separated OMB into three
categories based on the intention behind the behavior: Type D (intentions to inflict
damage), Type S (intentions to benefit the self), and Type O (intentions to benefit the
organization). While Type D and Type S fit the definition of CWB, Type O is analogous
to UPB. Vadera and Pratt (2013) constructed a theory similar to OMB, separating
workplace crimes based on the intended purpose of the crime. The workplace crime
categories were congruent with those of OMB, but were called anti-organizational
(intended to damage), non-aligned organizational (self-benefiting) and pro-organizational
(UPB-like).
These publications are integral contributions to UPB theory for their
acknowledgment that some deliberate employee misbehavior is intended to be proorganizational. However, the definition of OMB encompasses both actions that are
unethical (violations of core societal values) and actions that simply go against the
organization’s wishes (violations of organizational norms; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). This
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is also true for the definition of workplace crimes (Vadera & Pratt, 2013). UPB only
includes pro-organizational actions that violate societal ethical standards, as opposed to
actions that simply violate organizational norms and expectations. For example, if a baker
breaks company policy by changing a signature recipe in hopes of attracting more
customers, she would have committed OMB-D and pro-organizational workplace crime,
but not UPB. However, if that baker chose to bake with expired ingredients in order to
save her company money, her actions could be described as UPB as well as OMB-D and
pro-organizational workplace crime.
Violating societal ethical standards.
Warren (2003) distinguished employee deviance on the dimensions of compliance
versus violation of organizational norms and compliance versus violation of societal
ethical norms; this taxonomy also helps to define UPB. Using these categorizations,
Warren (2003) described four types of employee deviance: (1) constructive-conformity
(conforms to both organization and societal ethical norms), (2) constructive-deviance
(violates organization norms, but conforms to societal ethical norms), (3) destructiveconformity (conforms to organization norms but violates societal ethical norms) and (4)
destructive-deviance (violates both organization and societal ethical norms). They noted
that some deviance is positive, such as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB
is discretionary extra-role behavior employees perform on their own volition to help
support their coworkers or their company (Borman, 2004). OCB falls under the
constructive-conformity category, and is deviant in the sense that OCBs are beyond the
normal in-role expectations of the employee (Warren, 2003). Constructive-deviance is
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also considered positive, as this category represents actions that oppose any norms or
expectations of the organization that would violate societal ethical norms. Whistle
blowing behaviors fall under the constructive-deviance category.
Destructive-conformity and destructive-deviance are both considered harmful, as
they represent behaviors that violate societal ethical norms. If an organization explicitly
or implicitly condones the harmful behaviors, then these behaviors are categorized as
destructive-conformity. If the harmful behavior violates both societal and organizational
ethical expectations, this is considered destructive-deviance. UPB can fall under both
destructive-conformity and destructive-deviance. To be considered UPB, a behavior must
be extra-role, or discretionary on the part of the employee; this qualifies the behavior as
deviant, under Warren’s (2003) theory. To qualify as UPB, actions also must “violate
core societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” in pursuit of
organizational gains: this is a violation of societal ethical norms (Umphress & Bingham,
2011, p. 622). Furthermore, the definition of UPB includes all pro-organizational ethical
violations, regardless of whether they violate the organization’s norms or expectations. If
it is the norm within the organization to prioritize the organization’s goals to the point of
violating societal morals, then UPB in that company is destructive-conformity. If, on the
other hand, an employee goes against the norms of the organization to commit UPB, then
this is considered destructive-deviance.
Warren’s (2003) model of employee deviance does not distinguish actions based
on the intended beneficiary: this means that destructive-conformity and destructivedeviance both include actions that are committed for self-benefit along with actions that
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were intended to be pro-organizational. This contrasts with UPB, which only includes
pro-organizational behaviors that violate societal ethical norms, but does not differentiate
based on organizational norms and expectations.
UPB compared to detrimental citizenship behavior.
The term that most closely aligns with UPB is detrimental citizenship behavior
(DCB), which is defined as “behaviour that goes beyond reason and necessity to promote
specific organizational goals and, in so doing, harms legitimate stakeholder interests”
(Pierce & Aguinis, 2013, p. 4). Stakeholders in this context are any parties that might be
affected by the actions of the organization, be it customers, employees, members of the
surrounding community, or any other affected party (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). DCB,
like UPB, is conceptualized as an umbrella construct that combines the same key features
from the same employee behavior taxonomies used in defining UPB.
Despite the significant similarities between DCB and UPB, the authors of DCB
asserted that the two constructs differ: they state that DCB is conceptually broader than
UPB because the measure of harm for DCB is more inclusive (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013).
The authors defined DCB as behavior that “harms legitimate stakeholder interests,”
whereas UPB’s stated definition includes that the behavior must “violate core societal
values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013, p. 4;
Umphress & Bingham, 2011, p. 622). Pierce and Aguinis (2013) argue that any proorganizational behavior that violates societal values or standards of conduct (viz., UPB)
is by design a violation of stakeholder interests (i.e., DCB). Even if no outside party is
truly harmed, employee actions that violate societal ethical values are damaging to the
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organization’s image, and harming the organization’s image violates certain stakeholders’
interests. For this reason, they assert that all acts of UPB qualify as DCB.
Pierce and Aguinis (2013) go on to claim that not all DCB is UPB, because DCB
also includes actions that unreasonably adhere to societal rules or expectations in ways
that unjustifiably harm legitimate stakeholder interests. One example of this type of
behavior is the Bush administration’s decision to allow the NSA to secretly collect
metadata from Americans’ phone communications (Mascaro, 2015). As an organization,
one of the main objectives of the American government is to provide security for the
American people from all potential threats; it is reasonable to assume that American
society values and expects this protection. However, in the interest of advancing this
organizational goal, individuals within the Bush administration implemented a program
to indiscriminately collect bulk data on American citizens’ phone records without the
knowledge of the American people and without congressional authorization. Although
there are mixed sentiments on the subject, many Americans hold the opinion that the
indiscriminant collection of citizens’ phone records unjustifiably violates individuals’
right to privacy, which is another fundamental value within American society. Pierce and
Aguinis (2013) state that such actions could not be considered UPB because they comply
with certain societal expectations, albeit in harmful and unjustifiable ways. I argue that
this logic is disputable, because any pro-organizational behavior that unreasonably
adheres to a specific societal standard of conduct (e.g., protecting Americans’ safety) to
the point that it violates legitimate stakeholder interests (e.g., individuals’ right to
privacy) would automatically also violate broader societal values. Therefore, these
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special case DCB actions adhere to some aspect of societal norms, but still violate others,
qualifying them as UPB. Taking these arguments into consideration, I assert that all acts
of UPB are DCB, and likewise all acts of DCB are UPB. Although both terms appear
equally informative in describing their shared construct, I choose to use the term UPB
over DCB due to the greater amount of research literature featuring the term UPB
(Castille, Buckner, & Thoroughgood, 2016; Effelsberg, Solga, & Gurt, 2014; Gils, Hogg,
Van Quaquebeke, & van Knippenberg, 2015; Graham, Ziegert, & Capitano, 2015;
Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng, & Schaubroeck, 2014; Ilie, 2012; Matherne III &
Litchfield, 2012; Miao, Newman, Yu, & Xu, 2013; Ng & Feldman, 2015; Umphress &
Bingham, 2011; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010; Vadera & Pratt, 2013; Verma &
Mohapatra, 2015) compared to DCB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013).
Key definitional features of UPB.
By comparing and contrasting UPB with related terms, researchers have
thoroughly defined the features and boundary conditions of UPB (Pierce & Aguinis,
2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). UPB is defined primarily based on two key features:
(1) the behavior must be intended to benefit one’s organization, and (2) the behavior must
violate societal ethical standards (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). To qualify as UPB, the
behavior must also be extra-role (i.e., the behavior cannot be explicitly required as part of
an employee’s job), and the action must be done deliberately (i.e., with knowledge of the
ethical violation involved), but UPB is not required to violate organizational norms (e.g.,
the behavior may be implicitly condoned by the organization). Additionally, UPB always
harms legitimate stakeholder interests in some way, as associated with the violation of
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societal ethical standards (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). See Table 1 for an overview of the
shared and distinct defining features of UPB compared to related constructs.
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Table 1: Definitions of and distinctions between employee behavior constructs.

Term
Unethical pro-organizational behavior

Definition
Actions that are intended to promote the effective functioning of the
organization or its members (e.g., leaders) and that violate core
societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct.

Detrimental Citizenship Behavior

Discretionary employee behavior that goes beyond reason and
necessity to promote specific organizational goals and, in so doing,
harms legitimate stakeholder interests

Extra-role
behavior?

Intended to
benefit the
organization?

Actions deliberate,
with knowledge of
consequences?

Always

Always

Always

Always

Always

Always

Deviant Workplace Behavior:
deviance

Destructive- Behavior that violates both organizational norms and societal ethical
standards

Always

Sometimes

Always

Deviant Workplace Behavior:
conformity

Destructive- Behavior that aligns with organizational norms, but violates societal
ethical standards

Always

Sometimes

Always

Organizational Misbehavior: Type O

Any intentional action by members of organizations, meant to benefit
the organization, that defies and violates (i) shared organizational
norms and expectations, and/or (ii) core societal values, mores and
standards of proper conduct

Usually

Always

Always

Organizational Citizenship Behavior

Extra-role behaviors intended help to support the essential functions of
the organization.

Always

Always

Always

Counterproductive Work Behaviors

Intentional employee behavior that violates the legitimate interests of
the organization

Always

Rarely

Always
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Empirical Research on UPB
Previous empirical research has examined many possible predictors of UPB in
order to gain an understanding of the organizational and individual risk factors of UPB.
These findings have revealed that UPB shares many antecedents with both unethical
workplace behaviors as well as OCBs.
UPB antecedents shared with OCBs.
Many studies have found that UPB is correlated with variables previously thought
to only have positive impacts on workplace behavior (LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002).
These variables generally fall into two categories: individuals’ positive attitudes towards
their organization, and variables that lead to positive employee attitudes.
Positive correlations have been found between UPB and variables related to
employees’ positive attitudes towards their organization (Effelsberg et al., 2014;
Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; Miao et al., 2013; Umphress et al., 2010). Employees’
organizational identification has been found to increase individuals’ willingness to
engage in UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Umphress et al., 2010). High levels of
organizational affective commitment have also shown to increase individuals’
willingness to engage in UPB (Matherne III & Litchfield, 2012). Additionally, strong
identification with organizational leaders has been found to increase employees’
intentions to commit UPB (Miao et al., 2013).
Many studies have also found evidence that certain supportive leadership styles
and benevolent organizational climates are associated with increased UPB. Multiple
studies have found that employees under transformational leadership are more willing to
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engage in UPB compared to employees under transactional leadership (Effelsberg et al.,
2014; Graham et al., 2015). Additionally, a study examining the effects of ethical
leadership found that, in some instances, an increase in ethical leadership was linked to
an increase in UPB (Miao et al., 2013). This study found an inverted U-shaped
relationship such that, when leadership ethicality was low or high, this resulted in less
UPB than when ethical leadership was moderate, which resulted in the highest incidence
of UPB (Miao et al., 2013). Even ethical organizational climate, another variable thought
to increase employees’ ethical behavior as well as OCBs, has been found to be positively
associated with UPB (Miao et al., 2013; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). 1 Despite all the
findings that show the similarities in the predictors of OCB and UPB, UPB has not been
found to be significantly correlated (positively or negatively) with OCB (Umphress et al.,
2010).
UPB antecedents shared with unethical workplace behavior
Although UPB is associated with many organizational variables that typically
generate positive workplace behaviors, UPB also shares many predictors with unethical
workplace behavior. Thus far, all the antecedents shared with unethical workplace
behavior relate to individual employees’ personal sense of morality.
Effelsberg and colleagues (2014) found that individuals’ personal disposition
towards unethical behavior positively moderates the effect of organizational
identification on individuals’ UPB; likewise, Matherne III and Litchfield (2012) found
that employees’ level of moral identity negatively moderated the effect of organizational
1

A possible methodological explanation for the positive correlation between ethical climate and UPB will
be discussed in a later section on organizational climate measurement considerations.
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affective commitment on employees’ intentions to commit UPB. Machiavellianism, a
personality trait linked to amoral manipulation and deception, has been found to greatly
increase one’s willingness to engage in UPB (Castille et al., 2016). Individuals’ ethical
ideology, classified as idealist (those who believe that harm to others is never justified)
and relativist (those who reject the concept of universal moral principles), also has been
found to influence individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB; individuals high in
relativism were more willing to engage in UPB while individuals high in idealism were
less willing to engage in UPB (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015).
The evidence that UPB shares antecedents with both OCB and unethical
workplace behavior is fascinating from a research perspective, but disturbing when
considering the possible consequences from an organizational context. Organizations
strive to create a supportive environment for their employees as this has been shown to
have favorable effects such as increasing employee productivity and OCBs, and
decreasing turnover (Borman, 2004; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004). A supportive
organizational environment produces these beneficial organizational outcomes at least in
part through increasing employees’ positive attitudes towards their organization, as
indexed by variables such as organizational identification and organizational affective
commitment. Unfortunately, research has revealed that these same organizational and
individual factors that foster positive organizational outcomes also increase UPB, even
ethical leadership and ethical organizational climate, which by their very names are
expected to decrease unethical behavior.
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Although much time and effort is spent both in research and applied settings to
combat unethical workplace behaviors such as employee theft and other CWBs, much
less emphasis is placed on understanding and preventing UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013;
Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Umphress et al., 2010). Nevertheless, UPB can have
disastrous consequences for both the organizations in which they occur and for the
stakeholders that fall victim to them (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). While it may be
unrealistic to expect organizations to inhibit the organizational factors that encourage
both beneficial organizational outcomes and UPB, it would be irresponsible to ignore the
connection between positive organizational environments and UPB. Fortunately,
researchers have utilized psychological theory to suggest a probable explanation for the
unusual combination of antecedents associated with UPB.
Theoretical Explanations of UPB
Norm of reciprocity.
While it may appear counterintuitive that transformational and ethical leadership
and ethical climate have been found to increase incidents of UPB, researchers have
explained these seemingly illogical relationships by asserting that employees are often
motivated towards UPB because they are compelled to repay the perceived benefits they
have received from their organization (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham,
2011). The social norm of reciprocity is often cited in support of this explanation (Miao
et al., 2013; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011).
The norm of reciprocity refers to the belief that benefits given from one individual
to another are generally repaid in kind, creating a cyclical pattern of favorable exchanges
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(Gouldner, 1960). This also extends to employees’ relationships with their organization:
an employee may feel compelled towards UPB if that employee feels they are otherwise
unable to repay their obligation to their organization. Likewise, an employee may be
motivated toward UPB due to an assumption that any benefit the employee achieves for
his organization will be rewarded in equal measure (Umphress et al., 2010). Past research
has found that employees who feel well supported by their organization tend to also feel
an increased obligation to provide benefits for the organization in the form of achieving
organizational goals (Organ, 1990); this is suggested to increase tendencies towards UPB
(Umphress et al., 2010). Evidence suggests that supervisors utilizing transformational or
ethical leadership styles tend to develop supportive relationships with their employees
(Simola, Barling, & Turner, 2010; Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000); considering the
norm of reciprocity, this could explain the connection between these leadership types and
employee UPB. Likewise, ethical organizational climate has been found to correlate with
employees’ job satisfaction (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), organizational
identification (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015), and even a sense of indebtedness to the
organization (Kelley & Dorsch, 1991); these relationships suggest that ethical
organizational climate may increase UPB through increasing employees’ desire to
achieve organizational goals as a form of repayment.
Dueling motivational mechanisms.
An additional theoretical explanation for UPB also emphasizes the motivational
process leading to UPB, but extends this reasoning past that explained by the norm of
reciprocity. DCM researchers assert that all predictors for DCB (and likewise for UPB)
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fall into one of two categories: (1) variables that influence employees’ organizational
concern, or (2) variables that influence employees’ ethical sensitivity (Pierce & Aguinis,
2013). Organizational concern is defined as the extent to which an individual values the
achievement of organizational goals, and ethical sensitivity is the extent to which an
individual emphasizes ethical considerations when making decisions. Pierce and Aguinis
(2015) argue that, when faced with an opportunity to commit DCB or UPB, these two
motivational mechanisms lead to opposing action tendencies within the individual (Pierce
& Aguinis, 2013). Based on this theory, the balance between organizational concern and
ethical sensitivity predicts UPB: individuals with higher organizational concern than
ethical sensitivity will be more likely to engage in UPB, whereas individuals whose
ethical sensitivity outweighs their organizational concern will be less likely to engage in
UPB.
Dueling motivational mechanisms applied to the UPB model.
The model theorized by UPB researchers aligns with the dueling motivational
mechanisms theory; each of the proposed variables clearly influence either organizational
concern or ethical sensitivity (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The
UPB model emphasizes the impact of (1) positive social exchange and (2) organizational
identification on (3) ethical neutralization. Ethical neutralization is defined as a cognitive
mechanism used by the individual to reduce ethical salience and awareness when making
ethical decisions (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The UPB model also includes (4) amoral
culture and (5) individual moral development as moderators, so that employees with
lower moral development or who work for amoral organizations will tend to have
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stronger ethical neutralization reactions. The researchers assert that higher levels of
organizational identification, positive social exchange, ethical neutralization, and amoral
culture will increase UPB, while higher levels of moral development will decrease UPB.
Past research suggests that organizational concern and ethical sensitivity relate to the key
components of the UPB model: organizational identification and positive social exchange
influence organizational concern, and ethical neutralization, amoral culture, and moral
development affect ethical sensitivity (Hannah et al., 2014; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013;
Umphress et al., 2010; Vadera & Pratt, 2013).
Dueling motivational mechanisms applied to known UPB predictors.
All empirically supported predictors of UPB can also be explained using the
theory of dueling motivational mechanisms. Ethical organizational climate, ethical
leadership, and transformational leadership all increase employees’ organizational
concern, as explained through the norm of reciprocity. Employees high in organizational
affective commitment, organizational leader identification, or organizational
identification also all tend to be motivated by organizational concern (Avey, Avolio,
Crossley, & Luthans, 2009; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008). The theoretical effect of these
variables on organizational concern could explain why they positively correlate with
UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Matherne III & Litchfield, 2012; Miao et al., 2013;
Umphress et al., 2010). Likewise, individuals with strong moral identities and with an
idealistic ethical ideology would have a high level of ethical sensitivity; individuals with
higher personal disposition toward unethical behavior, those with a relativistic ethical
ideology, and those high in Machiavellianism would have a lower level of ethical
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sensitivity. These variables’ theoretical relationship with ethical sensitivity exactly
mirrors their known relationships with UPB.
The study examining ethical leadership and UPB is a multilayered example of the
dueling motivational mechanisms. Ethical leadership is conceptualized to involve both
encouraging employees to behave ethically and also always supporting employees by
treating them fairly and ethically (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005). For this reason,
ethical leadership appears to affect subordinates by increasing their organizational
concern (explained by the norm of reciprocity), but also by increasing their ethical
sensitivity.
If leadership ethicality affected employee organizational concern in a linear
fashion, but only significantly increased employee ethical sensitivity when ethical
leadership was high, this would explain the non-linear relationship found between ethical
leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013). When supervisors had low ethical leadership
scores, UPB was also low; theoretically, this type of supervision would be associated
with low employee ethical sensitivity but equally low employee organizational concern.
When supervisors’ ethical leadership was moderate, this appeared to have a stronger
impact on employees’ organizational concern than on their ethical sensitivity; the
resulting imbalance could explain the significantly higher levels of UPB. Lastly, when
supervisors’ ethical leadership was high, this resulted in decreased levels of UPB; this
could be explained by the highly ethical leadership compelling employee ethical
sensitivity to once again match employee organizational concern. Although this theory
has not been empirically tested, the motivational mechanisms of organizational concern
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and ethical sensitivity appear to complement the theoretical model of UPB as well as the
empirical evidence concerning UPB predictors.
Ethical decision making theory.
Other theoretical explanations for UPB have focused on the process employees
use to make workplace decisions. Each time an employee is presented with an
opportunity to commit UPB, that employee performs an internal decision-making process
to determine the best course of action (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Ethical decision-making
(EDM) theory studies this process used by individuals when making decisions in
situations involving ethical dilemmas (Rest, 1986). EDM theory delineates the four steps
necessary to take the ethical action in a moral quandary: moral sensitivity (noticing the
moral significance of a situation), moral judgment (determining the morally correct
action), moral motivation (deciding whether to choose the morally correct option), and
moral character (following through by engaging in the moral action). Based on the EDM
theory, if an individual is able to successfully complete all four of these steps, then the
ethical choice will be taken (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Rest, 1986; Trevino & Ball,
1992). Research utilizing EDM theory typically theorizes the influence of various
variables on one or more of the steps in the EDM process, searching for factors that
might cause this process to go awry (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010).
EDM theory and dueling motivational mechanisms.
DCB researchers suggest that the two motivational mechanisms of organizational
concern and ethical sensitivity may predict employee UPB by influencing the EDM
process (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). These researchers assert that, when presented with an
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opportunity to commit UPB, an employee may fail to notice the moral significance of the
situation (i.e., fail the first step in the EDM process) if the employee’s ethical sensitivity
is too low (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Furthermore, that employee may incorrectly
determine the morally appropriate action or may decide to choose an immoral option (i.e.,
fail the second or third steps in the EDM process) if the employee’s level of
organizational concern far outweighs that employee’s level of ethical sensitivity.
The multiple theoretical explanations for UPB appear to complement rather than
contradict each other, each explaining separate but related aspects of the internal process
that lead employees to engage in UPB. The norm of reciprocity, EDM theory, and the
concept of balance between organizational concern and ethical sensitivity are all integral
to the theoretical basis for the present proposed study.
Organizational Climate and UPB
Perhaps the most unsettling finding in UPB research is the positive relationship
between ethical climate and UPB; this suggests that the very environment that would
logically be utilized to discourage UPB appears to have the opposite effect. However,
considering the curvilinear relationship found between ethical leadership and UPB (Miao
et al., 2013), it may be that ethical climate, like ethical leadership, has a multifaceted
effect on UPB. While there is a methodological concern (which will be described in the
coming pages) that may explain the positive linear relationship between ethical climate
and UPB, this issue would be unable to account for the curvilinear relationship found
between ethical leadership (a variable highly correlated with ethical climate; Demirtas &
Akdogan, 2014; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) and UPB.
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This proposal will add to the understanding of the relationship between
organizational climate and UPB by integrating organizational climate theory with the
other theories utilized in UPB research. In this section, I will first (1) offer an overview of
organizational climate theory, followed by (2) an examination of the climates that I
propose will most directly influence UPB. I will then (3) explain the measurement issues
involved in organizational climate research as well as issues specific to ethical climate
research, and (4) suggest the most accurate and valid methods for measuring climate in
the proposed study.
Organizational climate review.
Organizational climate is defined as the “shared perceptions of and the meaning
attached to the policies, practices, and procedures employees experience and the
behaviors they observe getting rewarded and that are supported and expected”
(Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013, p. 362). Employees develop a sense of their
organization’s climate by working with other employees in a shared environment,
experiencing the organization’s policies, practices, and procedures first hand, interacting
with subordinates, coworkers, and supervisors, and observing the experiences of other
employees within the organization. Organizational climate gives employees guidelines
for what they can expect from their organizational environment and how they should
behave within the organization. Organizational climate has been found to have a
powerful effect on employees, influencing employee behavior and attitudes above and
beyond the effects of individual preferences, values, and beliefs (Ostroff, Kinicki, &
Tamkins, 2003).
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Organizational climates can be operationalized at any level within the
organization (from company-wide to team units), depending on the referent used in the
climate measure (Ehrhart & Raver, 2014). Departmental climate is the most common
level to operationalize climate (Schneider et al., 2013); climate at the department level
(defined as all employees directly under the same supervisor) has generally been found to
have the strongest influence on employee behavior compared to other levels of climate
(Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2009; Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009).
Molar climate.
There are many types of organizational climate, from overall climate (molar
climate) to a vast assortment of sub-climates (focused climates) that each index the
climate of a particular aspect of organizational life. Organizational molar climate conveys
the employees’ overall sense of whether their organization provides a positive work
environment (Schneider et al., 2013). Molar climate measures often include items asking
employees to rate how much their organization cares about its employees, how peopleoriented their organization is, and how well their organization treats its employees.
Strategic climates.
Focused climates can be sub-divided into strategic climates and process climates
(Schneider et al., 2013). Strategic climates index employees’ perceptions of their
organization’s expectations related to a particular strategic outcome. Strategic climates
carry information about the level of priority placed on achieving a particular outcome,
and what employee behavior is expected in relation to that outcome. Service climate is an
example of a frequently studied strategic climate (Schneider, Macey, Lee, & Young,
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2009). In organizations with strong service climates, employees perceive that their
organization highly values customer service and that their organization expects
employees to prioritize customer service with their actions. Furthermore, employees of
organizations with strong customer service climates can expect to be rewarded for good
customer service and can expect to be reprimanded for poor customer service. Successful
strategic climates lead to specific changes in employee behavior which in turn lead to
achievement of the strategic outcome. Studies have found that organizations with higher
customer service climate have higher customer satisfaction scores (Schneider et al.,
2009), mediated by customer-oriented OCB (Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & NilesJolly, 2005).
Process climates.
Process climates reflect an organization’s expectations related to a particular set
of procedures or operating methods (Schneider et al., 2013). Process climates also carry
information about the priorities of the organization and the organization’s behavioral
expectations for its employees, but in relation to an organizational process as opposed to
an organizational outcome. Procedural justice climate is an example of an organizational
process climate. In organizations with strong procedural justice climates, employees
perceive that their organization emphasizes the use of a fair process in resolving disputes
and allocating resources, and that their organization expects its employees to maintain
procedural justice in all work activities (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002). Process
climates tend to affect both employee attitudes as well as employee behavior: procedural
justice climate has been linked to increased team performance (Colquitt et al., 2002),
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increased OCBs (Ehrhart, 2004), decreased turnover (Simons & Roberson, 2003), and
increased organizational commitment and satisfaction (Liao & Rupp, 2005).
Foundational climates.
Although strategic climates convey employees’ perceptions of the outcomes that
are highly valued by their organization, it may take more than a strong strategic climate
for an organization to attain those strategic outcomes. Climate researchers have suggested
that foundational climates, including molar climate and some process climates (e.g.,
procedural justice climate, ethical climate, and work facilitation climate), must be in
place before strategic climates can influence employee behavior to achieve the strategic
outcome (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011). Foundational climates provide employees
with the perception that their organization cares about supporting its employees, either in
a general sense as with molar climate, or in a specific way as with certain process
climates. In accordance with the norm of reciprocity, climate researchers argue that
employees in organizations with established foundational climates will be motivated to
repay their organization in the form of achieving organizational goals; employees will
then look to their organizations’ strategic climates for information about which
organizational goals they should prioritize. In other words, foundational climates increase
the salience of strategic climates for employees and strengthen the relationship between
strategic climates and the relevant organizational outcomes. In support of this theory, one
study found that a combination of both supportive foundational climates and service
climate was necessary to achieve the strategic outcome of high customer satisfaction
(Schulte, Ostroff, Shmulyian, & Kinicki, 2009). Interestingly, moderate levels of
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foundational climates were sufficient to allow service climate to take effect; they found
little additional benefit to customer satisfaction as foundational climates increased from
moderate to high levels.
Climates relevant to UPB.
Based on climate and UPB theory and research, I propose that a combination of
ethical climate and goals climate will display a strong influence on individual and
department-level UPB.
Ethical climate.
Ethical climate is defined as “the shared perception of what is correct behavior,
and how ethical situations should be handled in an organization” (Victor & Cullen, 1987,
p. 51). As described previously, ethical climate has been found to positively correlate
with UPB, although theoretical arguments can be made for a more multifaceted
relationship between ethical climate and UPB. Ethical climate is defined as a
foundational process climate (Schneider et al., 2013). Like other foundational climates,
ethical climate has been found to increase job satisfaction (Martin & Cullen, 2006;
Neubert, Carlson, Kacmar, Roberts, & Chonko, 2009), organizational commitment
(Kelley & Dorsch, 1991; Treviño et al., 1998), organizational identification (Verma &
Mohapatra, 2015) and attitudinal engagement (Tseng & Fan, 2011). Ethical climate also
influences the process through which employees react to ethical situations in the
workplace; ethical climate has demonstrated to positively relate to employee moral
intensity (DeConick, 2003), ethical judgements (Bartels, Harrick, Martell, & Strickland
1998; DeConick, 2003), ethical intentions (Buchan, 2005), and moral decision making
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(Verbeke, Ouwerkerk, & Peelen, 1996). Additionally, ethical climate has shown to
negatively relate to employee theft and lying (Martin & Cullen, 2006), antisocial
behavior (Mayer et al., 2010), and general unethical behavior (Peterson, 2002).
Based on the known effects ethical climate has on employee behavior, the
argument can be made that ethical climate relates to both motivational mechanisms
thought to influence UPB. Ethical climate increases employees’ ethical sensitivity, as
evidenced by ethical climate’s ability to decrease unethical behavior and improve
employees’ ethical decision making. This indicates that ethical climate should decrease
employees’ willingness in engage in all unethical behaviors, including UPB. 2 Research
has indicated that ethical climate also increases employees’ organizational concern. As
with all foundational climates, organizations with strong ethical climates tend to engage
their employees in a supportive way, engendering employees’ percieved organizational
support and other positive attitudes towards their organization (Demirtas & Akdogan,
2014). This increases employees’ organizational concern, motivating employees to repay
their recieved benefits by achieving organizational goals. Higher organizational concern
is suggested to increase willingness to engage in UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013).
If organizational concern could be measured and tested along with ethical climate
as predictors of UPB, this may deconflate the two motivational influences ethical climate
exerts on employees’ willingness to engage in UPB. After accounting for ethical

2

While it is likely that a highly ethical climate would discourage UPB, this does not mean that UPB could
never occur in a highly ethical organization. This illustrates the difference between destructive-deviance
UPB and destructive-conformity UPB. In a highly ethical organization, UPB would be destructivedeviance, as the UPB would violate both societal and organizational ethical norms. In an organization with
a low level of ethical climate, UPB may be considered destructive-conformity, as the UPB would still
violate societal ethical standards but may be viewed as normative behavior within the organization.
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climate’s effect on UPB through individuals’ organizational concern, I expect that ethical
climate will be negatively related to UPB. The curvilinear relationship found between
ethical leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013) may suggest that only highly ethical
environments are effective at decreasing UPB; I expect the same will hold true for ethical
climate and UPB.
H1a: There will be a direct negative curvilinear relationship between ethical
climate and individual willingness to engage in UPB; low and moderate levels of
ethical climate will not significantly affect individual willingness to engage in
UPB, while high levels of ethical climate will significantly reduce individual
willingness to engage in UPB.
I will be assessing participants’ level of organizational concern through a measure
of organizational identification (described in the following paragraph), but as
organizational concern will be measured in reference to the individual participant and not
the participants’ work group, I will be unable to assess department-level organizational
concern using my proposed methods (described in the next section). For this reason, I
will be unable to deconflate the dual influences of ethical climate on department-level
UPB. Consequently, I predict the effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB will be
similar to the inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship previously found between ethical
leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013).
H1b: There will be an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between ethical
climate and departmental UPB; low and high ethical climate will correspond to
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lower levels of departmental UPB, whereas moderate ethical climate will
correspond to higher levels of department UPB.
Based on theory and past research, I expect organizational concern to be
positively related to UPB. However, organizational concern is currently a purely
theoretical construct used to explain the motivational mechanism linking certain variables
(e.g., organizational identification and organizational affective commitment) to UPB;
there are no existing scales to measure organizational concern directly. Despite this, I
expect organizational identification, a variable cited as a major contributor to
organizational concern (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013), will serve as a
comparable substitute to examine the relationship between ethical climate and UPB.
Organizational identification represents an employee’s sense of belonging to his or her
organization and the extent to which the employee self-identifies with his or her
organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Highly identified employees internalize their
organization’s goals as their own, directly leading to increased organizational concern. In
this way, I expect that organizational identification will partially mediate the relationship
between ethical climate and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H2a: Ethical climate will have a positive effect on organizational identification.
H2b: Organizational identification will have a positive effect on individual
willingness to engage in UPB.
Goals climate.
Organizational goals climate will also likely influence employees’ willingness to
engage in UPB. Goals climate is defined as employees’ perceptions of the emphasis their
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organization places on achieving organizational objectives, and their perceptions of the
behavioral expectations placed on employees related to achieving company goals.
Although goals climate has not yet been empirically studied, similar constructs such as
performance pressure (felt pressure to meet organizational performance expectations) and
instrumental climate (organizational climate valuing employee and organizational
interests over all other concerns) have been found to lead to unethical employee sales
tactics (Murphy & Free, 2015; Ross Jr & Robertson, 2003). Furthermore, key
organizational antecedents that would theoretically lead to a strong goals climate (e.g.,
employee compensation tied to meeting organizational goals and supervisor emphasis of
company goals) have also been linked to less ethical employee sales behavior (Robertson
& Anderson, 1993; Román & Luis Munuera, 2005). For these reasons, I expect high
organizational goals climate to increase individual willingness to engage in UPB as well
as lead to increased amounts of UPB within the department.
H3a: Organizational goals climate will have a positive effect on individual
willingness to engage in UPB.
H3b: Organizational goals climate will have a positive effect on departmental
UPB.
Goals climate is a strategic outcome climate; this means that employees must first
be positively motivated before goals climate can effectivly change employee behavior
towards the desired outcome of achieving company goals. Ethical climate, as a
foundational climate, motivates employees’ efforts related to strategic climates. For this
reason, I anticipate ethical climate will interact with goals climate to predict UPB.
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H4a: Ethical climate will positively moderate the effect of goals climate on
individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H4b: Ethical climate will positively moderate the effect of goals climate on
departmental UPB.
Measuring ethical climate.
Although organizational ethical climate has been studied empirically for over 25
years (Victor & Cullen, 1987), there remains considerable disagreement regarding which
measure is most valid for studying ethical climate (Mayer, 2014). While the majority of
research examining ethical climate continues to use the oldest and most established
climate measure, the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ; Victor & Cullen, 1988), there
are several well-known flaws associated with the ECQ (Arnaud, 2010; Mayer, 2014;
Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2009). This has led to a call amongst researchers for the
development of a more valid measure of ethical climate; several new measures have since
been published (Arnaud, 2010; Babin, Boles, & Robin, 2000; Ross & Robertson, 2000;
Schwepker, 2001). Following a description of the ECQ and its flaws, I will describe the
Ethical Climate Index (ECI; Arnaud, 2010) and its advantages. Through this process, I
will offer several reasons why the most appropriate measure of ethical climate for use in
my proposed study is the Ethical Climate Index (ECI; Arnaud, 2010).
Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ).
The ECQ is designed to measure an organization’s ethical climate by assessing
employees’ perception of what constitutes “right” behavior. The ECQ designates
organizations as having one of nine different types of ethical climate based on the

32

interests the organization favors when making ethical decisions. The nine types of ethical
climate are defined based on where they fall on two dimensions: focus of analysis and
ethical criterion. Ethical criterion refers to the types of outcomes that are favored when
making ethical judgments; the three categories of ethical criterion are egoism (favoring
self-interest), benevolence (favoring the outcome that benefits the most people), and
principle (favoring compliance with rules, law, and procedures). Focus of analysis refers
to the referent level used in decision-making; the three levels are individual, local
(company-wide) and cosmopolitan (society-wide). By crossing the two dimensions, a
three by three matrix is created with a different type of ethical climate occupying each
space in the matrix. The nine ethical climate types include social responsibility
(benevolence x cosmopolitan; favoring outcomes that do the most good society-wide),
company rules and procedure (principle x local; favoring outcomes that comply with
company rules), and self-interest (egoism x individual; favoring outcomes that will
benefit oneself).
Although the ECQ is theoretically composed of nine factors, there is little
empirical evidence to support this typography (Arnaud, 2010; Martin & Cullen, 2006).
While each of the nine factors have been observed to some extent in empirical research,
the majority of studies using the ECQ have found only five factors (Martin & Cullen,
2006). See Figure 1 for a representation of the theoretical versus empirically supported
typographies of the ECQ. Additionally, the factor structure of the emergent ethical
climate types has been inconsistent between studies (Arnaud, 2010). The lack of a stable
factor number and structure is a major weakness of the ECQ; it calls the original
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theoretical typography of the ECQ into question and negatively impacts the validity and
reliability of the measure.
Figure 1: Theoretical & Empirical Factor Typography of the ECQ.
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Note: Originally published in (Martin & Cullen, 2006, p. 178).
Beyond the inconsistent factor number and structure, another shortcoming of the
ECQ is its lack of utility for predicting ethical behavior in the workplace. This limitation
has two potential contributing causes. First, the ECQ is designed to categorize
organizations into descriptive “types” of ethical climate rather than to rank-order
organizations based on normative level of ethicality. Some ECQ climate factors have
been shown to correlate with employee ethical behavior, while others do not seem to
have any relationship with ethical behavior; this means that higher scores on the ECQ do
not necessarily translate to a more ethical organization (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Scores
on the ECQ may be useful in sorting organizations into different ethical climate profiles,
but much less useful in predicting which organizations will be more or less ethical than
others.
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Another possible reason that the ECQ has a weak capacity for predicting ethical
behavior is that the ECQ only measures one step of the four-step process that EDM
theory suggests is necessary to achieve ethical behavior. EDM theory applied to
organizations would suggest that four conditions are necessary to generate ethical
employee behavior: moral sensitivity (are employees aware of ethical dilemmas when
they arise?), moral judgment (how do employees determine the ethically correct action?),
moral motivation (do employees choose to take the ethically correct action?), and moral
character (do employees follow through with their ethical intentions?). The ECQ
measures organizations’ moral judgment, while ignoring moral sensitivity, moral
motivation, and moral character.
Ethical Climate Index (ECI).
The ECI is a relatively new ethical climate measure produced in response to the
call for an alternative to the ECQ (Arnaud, 2010). The author of the ECI argues that the
four steps in the EDM process exist not only at the individual level, but also at the social
system level; the ECI is therefore designed to measure an organization’s normative
collective capacity to complete each of the four steps in the EDM process. Six factors are
utilized to cover the four EDM steps of moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral
motivation, and moral character. Collective moral sensitivity is measured using two
factors: Moral Awareness (capacity to envision possible alternative actions in a given
situation) and Empathetic Concern (capacity to predict how those actions will affect
others). Collective moral judgment reflects the typical criterion used in an organization to
determine which possible action is correct. As this step in the collective EDM process has
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been tested extensively by studies utilizing the ECQ, the ECI utilizes the items from the
ECQ that consistently loaded the highest on the three categories of ethical criterion
(egoism, benevolence and principle). From these ECQ items, the ECI creates two
collective moral judgment factors: Focus on Self (egoism items) and Focus on Others
(benevolence and principle items). The Moral Motivation factor measures the relative
value placed on ethical concerns when making organizational decisions. This factor
reflects an employees’ likelihood of choosing to pursue the ethical course of action as
opposed to an alternative unethical action. Lastly, the Moral Character factor measures
employees’ collective sense of efficacy concerning their ability to follow though and
implement the ethical course of action.
The ECI satisfies the shortcomings left by the ECQ. The ECI has demonstrated a
reliable factor structure, with confirmatory factor analysis providing evidence of six
distinct but related factors (Arnaud, 2006). Studies using the ECI have found supporting
evidence that the steps of the EDM process do exist at the social group level, based on
aggregation analysis (Arnaud, 2006; Kalshoven, Den Hartog, & De Hoogh, 2013).
Additionally, the ECI has shown promising predictive validity regarding employee
ethical behavior (Arnaud, 2010). The author of the ECI found that the total ECI measure
accounted for 22% of the variance in ethical behavior, which is markedly more than has
been historically found with the ECQ (Arnaud & Schminke, 2012). Interestingly, only
three of the six ECI factors (Empathic Concern, Moral Motivation, and Moral Character)
were found to have significant relationships with ethical behavior; neither of the
collective moral judgment factors were significant predictors of ethical behavior, which
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may explain the ECQ’s inconsistent relationship with ethical behavior. As my proposed
study will utilize ethical climate to predict employee (un)ethical behavior, I will use the
ECI rather than the more popular ECQ.
Potential measurement bias in past ethical climate-UPB research.
There is a possibility that the findings positively correlating ethical climate with
UPB are due at least in part to the type of ethical climate measure used. Both studies that
found a positive relationship between ethical climate and UPB (Miao et al., 2013; Verma
& Mohapatra, 2015) utilized similar ethical climate measures that were adapted from a
single ethical environment measure (Trevino et al., 1998). These measures prompt
respondents to rate the amount of ethical and unethical behavior within the respondent’s
organization and to rate the value placed on ethicality within the organization, but the
measures do not define ethicality or specify the types of behavior that should be
considered ethical or unethical. This allows respondents to define for themselves what
constitutes ethical and unethical behavior for the purposes of rating their organization.
Theoretically, an individual with extremely high personal ethicality might set a stricter
ethical standard from which to compare their organization than would an individual
without high personal ethical standards. This would lead highly ethical individuals to rate
their organization as having a comparatively low ethical climate, while less ethical
individuals would rate their organization as having a comparatively high ethical climate.
These same two studies operationally defined UPB as individual willingness to
engage in UPB. Theoretically, the highly ethical individuals (who down-rated their
organization’s ethical climate) might report low willingness to engage in UPB, whereas

37

the less ethical individuals (who up-rated their organization’s ethical environment) would
report higher willingness to engage in UPB. For this reason, the positive correlation
found between ethical climate and UPB may be due to differential responding based on
participants’ personal ethical standards rather than due to a true correlation between the
constructs.
This potential flaw present in past research should not affect my proposed study
for several reasons. First, my proposed ethical climate measure (the ECI) specifies the
types of behaviors relevant to the measure, therefore creating a standard against which
the respondents can compare their organization. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the
direct effect of ethical climate on UPB will be curvilinear rather than linear. If an
individual’s level of personal ethicality was inversely related to that individual’s ratings
of department ethical climate, and the individual’s level of ethicality was inversely
related to their willingness to engage in UPB, this would explain a positive linear
relationship between ethical climate and UPB, but not a curvilinear one. These
procedures will eliminate this alternative methodological explanation as a potential threat
to the conclusion validity of the proposed study.
Aggregating organizational climate.
As organizational climate reflects the shared perceptions of employees regarding
a particular aspect of their work life, it is ideal to analyze organizational climate at the
group-level. This is typically done by measuring psychological climate at the individual
level, and after establishing inter-group agreement, aggregating to the desired level.
Psychological climate refers to an individual employee’s perceptions about a particular
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aspect of their work environment; psychological climate can apply to any given level
within the organization, depending on the referent used in the measurement items. For
example, psychological ethical climate may apply to an employee’s perceptions of their
personal ethicality at work, “I prioritize ethical considerations at work,” the ethical
environment of the department, “People in my department prioritize ethical
considerations,” or the ethical environment of the whole organization “Employees in my
company prioritize ethical considerations.” The referent used in the measurement items
determines the appropriate level of aggregation when creating a group-level climate
score.
Although both aggregated departmental climate and psychological climate with
department-level referents have been found to predict individual employee behavior well,
there is evidence that aggregated department climate generally has a stronger relationship
with department-level employee behavior (Ostroff, 1993; Schulte, Ostroff, & Kinicki,
2006; Schulte et al., 2009). Despite this, there are several reasons why a study may
choose to analyze departmental climate at the psychological climate level. Analyzing
aggregate organizational climate requires sampling many employees from each
organization; logistically, this can limit the number of organizations sampled. When
studying the effects of an organizational climate on a specific outcome, it can be
beneficial to sample as many different organizations as possible in order increase the
potential diversity of climate levels observed (Cullen, Victor, & Bronson, 1993).
Additionally, certain sensitive topics may be difficult to accurately measure
within an organizational department. Many organizations are reluctant to allow research
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on uncomplimentary topics such as unethical employee behavior to be conducted on their
employees (Castille et al., 2016). Furthermore, employees may be hesitant to provide
honest answers regarding their own unethical workplace behavior if their organization is
in any way connected to the research. The most effective way to increase participants’
confidence in their anonymity is to collect data completely independently from any
organization and to not require participants to disclose the name of their organization
(Landers & Behrend, 2015). For these reasons, I will recruit a diverse sample of
participants, all from different organizations, and measure psychological climate using
referents at the department level. I will request information about the industry type and
approximate location of all participants to ensure no unintended nesting occurs in the
data.
Individual Differences and UPB
Organizational variables are far from the only influences on employee behavior:
individual differences between employees are another strong predictor of individual
employee behavior. Furthermore, individual differences between employees can affect
how those employees react to other variables (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003;
Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). I predict that the two
individual variables of ethical ideology (Forsyth, 1980) and moral potency (Hannah &
Avolio, 2010) will moderate the relationship between organizational climate and
organizational identification predicting UPB.
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Ethical ideology and UPB.
Individuals’ ethical ideology affects the types of considerations that are made
during moral judgment (the second step in the EDM process). There are thought to be
two dimensions of ethical ideology: relativism and idealism. Relativism reflects the
extent to which an individual rejects universal moral rules in favor of determining his or
her moral decisions on the specific situation at hand. Highly relativistic individuals
believe that there are no ethical rules that must be followed 100 percent of the time.
Idealism reflects the extent of an individual’s concern for the welfare of others when
making moral decisions; highly idealistic individuals believe that there is always a way to
avoid causing any harm to others when faced with a moral dilemma. Relativism and
idealism represent two distinct continua that both relate to an individual’s ethical
ideology; it is possible for an individual to be high or low on both dimensions, and most
empirical studies have found the two dimensions to be uncorrelated (Barnett, Bass, &
Brown, 1994; Cadogan, Lee, Tarkiainen, & Sundqvist, 2009; Davis, Andersen, & Curtis,
2001).
Multiple meta-analyses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Pan & Sparks, 2012) and a
literature review (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) have compiled the findings of more than
50 empirical studies testing the effects of these two dimensions of ethical ideology on
moral judgments and ethical decision making; all concluded that relativism tends to
negatively correlate with moral judgments and ethical decision making while idealism
tends to positively correlate with moral judgments and ethical decision making.
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The effects of ethical ideology on UPB have only been tested once, but the results
indicate that relativism and idealism affect individual willingness to engage in UPB in
much the same way as ethical ideology affects ethical decision making: relativism
increased UPB intentions, whereas idealism decreased UPB intentions (Verma &
Mohapatra, 2015). I expect to also find the same effect: relativism will be positively
related to willingness towards UPB, while idealism will be negatively related to
willingness towards UPB.
H5a: Relativism will have a positive effect on individual willingness to engage in
UPB.
H5b: Idealism will have a negative effect on individual willingness to engage in
UPB.
Furthermore, individuals’ ethical ideology has been found to interact with other
variables to predict UPB (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). Idealism was found to negatively
moderate the relationship between organizational identification and individual
willingness to engage in UPB, whereas relativism was found to positively moderate the
relationship between organizational identification and individual willingness to engage in
UPB. An individual’s ethical ideology influences which criteria receive the most weight
when making moral judgments; theoretically, this would influence how an individual
views each argument for or against a possible course of action. For this reason, I predict
that relativism and idealism will moderate the effect of each of the three variables
predicting individual willingness to engage in UPB.
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H6a: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between ethical climate
and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H6b: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between goals climate
and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H6c: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between organizational
identification and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H7a: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between ethical climate
and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H7b: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between goals climate
and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H7c: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between organizational
identification and individual willingness to engage in UPB.
Moral potency and UPB.
Moral potency reflects individual differences in capacity to complete the final two
stages in the EDM process (choosing to take the ethical choice and following through
with ethical action). The three dimensions of moral potency are moral ownership (the
extent to which individuals “feel a sense of psychological responsibility over the ethical
nature of their own actions”; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011, p. 674), moral courage (the
capacity to “commit to personal moral principles, under conditions where the actor is
aware of the objective danger involved in supporting those principles, that enables the
willing endurance of that danger, in order to act ethically or resist pressure to act
unethically as required to maintain those principles”; Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa,
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2011, p. 560) and moral efficacy (an individual’s sense of confidence in their own
abilities to produce the ethical outcome, even in the face of opposition). Research using a
military sample found all three dimensions within moral potency to positively relate to
soldiers’ commitment to Army values as well as soldiers’ intentions to report others’
unethical actions (Schaubroeck et al., 2010). Furthermore, soldiers’ moral courage has
been found to negatively correlate with past unethical actions (Hannah et al., 2013) and
positively correlate with ethical and pro-social actions (Hannah et al., 2011). Both moral
ownership and moral courage were related to how often a soldier would confront his or
her unit members over ethical transgressions.
Moral potency predicts individuals’ capacity to commit to engaging in the ethical
course of action; this suggests that moral potency should negatively relate to individuals’
willingness to engage in UPB.
H8: Moral potency will have a negative effect on individual willingness to engage
in UPB.
Furthermore, as moral potency theoretically predicts individuals’ willingness to
take the ethical course of action despite any opposition or pressure to act unethically
(Hannah et al., 2011), moral potency should reduce the effect of organizational
identification and goals climate on UPB.
H9a: Moral potency will negatively moderate the effect of organizational
identification on individual willingness to engage in UPB.
H9b: Moral potency will negatively moderate the effect of goals climate on
individual willingness to engage in UPB.
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Departmental UPB and Individual UPB
It is likely that employees’ individual willingness to engage in UPB will be
influenced by their perceptions of the overall amount of UPB within their department.
According to social learning theory, individuals tend to look to the behavior of others
around them to determine how to behave themselves (Bandura, 1977); likewise,
employees will decide whether UPB is acceptable in part by observing the normative
UPB activity within the workplace. Although not included as a specific hypothesis, the
effect of department-wide UPB on individuals’ willingness towards UPB will be included
in the model in order to control for this effect.
See Figure 2 for the proposed study model.
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Model.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD

Sample Selection
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is
an online crowdsourcing marketplace that enables individuals of the general public
(called workers) to complete short-term online services (HITs) for a fee. It also allows
various entities, called requesters (e.g., marketing companies, political organizations,
social science researchers) to pay workers to complete HITs. MTurk has been found to be
valid population sample from which to gather survey data for organizational research
(Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Carter et al., 2014).
In order to be recruited to participate, workers were required to live in the US and
have at least a 95% HIT approval rating on MTurk. This was to set basic parameters for
the sample population and to ensure that the participants have historically provided
quality responses to previously completed HITs. Workers who met these qualifications
were able to see the HIT among their available HITs, along with a brief description of the
HIT, “Take a confidential 30 minute survey about the workplace environment in your
current or past job, up to 10 years prior to now. You must have been employed for at least
6 months, for 28 or more hours a week, in an environment that allowed for frequent
interaction with other employees. Compensation is $3.63.” Assuring confidentiality was
important in order to help reduce evaluation apprehension, which can be especially
problematic when studying unfavorable topics such as unethical behavior (Ong & Weiss,
2000). Furthermore, participants were not required to report on their current organization,
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to reduce potential unease regarding providing negative information about one’s current
employer. Participants must have worked in a shared workplace environment for at least
6 months to ensure that the participant had adequate time to develop a sense of the
workplace climate; participants must have worked for the company within the last 10
years to ensure that they will still have an adequate memory of that workplace.
Compensation for the HIT was determined based on federal minimum wage for 30
minutes of work.
Workers that qualified and chose to accept the HIT were provided with a link to
the survey on Qualtrics. Along with the survey link, participants were presented with a
message stating that there would be attention checks within the survey, and participants
that fail the attention checks may be asked to return the HIT without compensation.
Attention checks take the form of survey questions that blend in with the other survey
items, but confirm that participants are reading carefully by requesting a specific
response (i.e., In my department, we are responsible for reading carefully. Choose
answer four.) It is a common practice on MTurk to use attention checks to screen out and
deny compensation to inattentive responders (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Despite this, the
evidence for the effectiveness of attention checks in identifying careless responders is
mixed (Meade & Craig, 2012; Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Rather than automatically
screening out and denying compensation to participants who failed attention checks, all
participants were compensated regardless of their responses to the attention checks.
Participant responses were later screened for outliers using attention check responses
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alongside other indicators of response quality, such as response time and Mahalanobis
distance scores.
When participants clicked on the survey link, they were first shown an
information letter that again assured them of their confidentiality, stated that they could
stop the survey at any time for any reason, and provided the participant with my contact
information in the event that they had any questions or concerns. After participants
acknowledged that they had read and agreed to the information letter, they were
instructed to: Pick a company that you have worked for in the last 10 years, or that you
currently work for. Make sure to pick a company that employed you for at least 6 months,
28 or more hours a week, in a workplace environment shared with other employees. We
will not ask you to name the company that you pick. For the remainder of the survey,
please respond to the questions based on how they apply to your employment at that
company. Participants were then asked demographic questions, followed by scale items;
the scales were divided into two blocks and the blocks were presented in a random order
to counterbalance item context effects and ordering effects (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee,
& Podsakoff, 2003).
Participants
Of the 410 total responses, ten outliers were identified and removed, leaving a
usable sample of 400. Age of the participants (when they worked for the target company)
ranged from 18 to 70 (M = 33.53, SD = 10.22). Years spent at target company ranged
from 8 months to 39 years (M = 5.38, SD = 4.75). Hours worked a week ranged from 28
to 65 (M = 40.98, SD = 6.86). The sample had slightly more males (216, 54%) than
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females (182, 45.5%), with 2 undeclared. Of the 400 participants, two (.5%) did not
complete high school, 123 (31%) held a high school diploma or GED, 96 (24%) held a 2year college degree, 135 (34%) held a 4-year college degree, and 44 (11%) held a
graduate degree. Fifty-five (13.8%) of the participants’ target companies were not-forprofit, 339 (84.8%) were for profit, and 6 (1.5%) were undeclared.
Measures
Ethical climate.
Department ethical climate was measured using the short form of the ECI
(Arnaud, 2010). The ECI assesses individuals’ perceptions of the ethical climate of their
department, which is ideal because department-level climate is thought to have a more
direct influence on individual employee outcomes than organization-level climate
(Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). Arnaud (2010) created this 18-item form of the ECI by
retaining the three items from each factor with the highest factor loadings. The
dimensions are Moral Awareness (α = .88), Empathetic Concern (α = .91), Focus on Self
(α = .92), Focus on Others (α = .87), Moral Motivation (α = .88), and Moral Character (α
= .83). All but one of the short form dimensions (Empathetic Concern; r = .88) have
correlations of between .93 – .96 with their corresponding original dimensions. Sample
items include People around here are aware of ethical issues, In my department it is
expected that you will always do what is right for society, In my department people are
willing to break the rules in order to advance in the company, and People in my
department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. Response choices range
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from 1 (Describes my department very well) to 5 (Does not describe my department at
all). See Appendix A.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results from past research have shown that
the 6-factor structure of the ECI fits the data well (RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, NFI = .96;
Arnaud, 2006). Aggregation analysis has shown that the measure is able to reflect
employees’ shared perceptions of department ethical climate, with median factor withingroup agreement (rwg) ranging from .71 – .85.
As evidence of convergent validity, ECI scores have been found to be highly to
moderately correlated with perceived general justice, procedural justice climate, and
safety climate (Arnaud, 2010). ECI scores are not correlated or only weakly correlated
with organizational structure, problem solving demand, and perceived functional
dependence; this demonstrates discriminant validity (Arnaud, 2010). The ECI has also
displayed criterion validity, explaining 22% of the variance in ethical behavior and 42%
of the variance in political behavior in the workplace (Arnaud, 2010).
While CFA results have shown that the ECI is composed of 6 highly-related but
distinct dimensions (Arnaud, 2006), no previous studies to date have tested the fit of
combining the sub-scales into a single higher-order factor. Having 6 separate variables
for ethical climate, however, would greatly complicate the structure of my proposed
model. I will consider loading the 6 ECI sub-dimensions onto a single second-order
factor by comparing the harm to model fit with the potential benefits to model parsimony.
If this approach is unsuccessful, I will test the hypotheses separately with each ECI
factor.
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Goals climate.
Department goals climate perceptions were measured using a 13-item Goals
Climate Scale adapted from Jiang and Probst’s (2015) Productivity Climate Scale (α =
.85), which was in turn adapted from a Safety Climate Scale (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000;
α = .93).
The original Safety Climate Scale was designed to measure various aspects of
employees’ workplace environment that contribute to safety climate development, such
as safety training, communication about safety at work, and an overall emphasis on
safety. Items were adapted to measure productivity climate by replacing references to
safety with productivity references; the same process was done for the current study by
adapting the subject matter of the questions to focus on department goals. The referent
level used in the safety climate and productivity climate versions had some inconsistency,
with some items oriented towards individual-level climate and other items oriented
towards organization-level climate. For use in this study, all items reference departmentlevel climate. Items from the Productivity Climate Scale include Employees are regularly
consulted about how best to meet production goals and schedules, and If production
goals and schedules are not met, I could face negative job-related consequences. Those
items adapted for the present study read Employees in my department are regularly
consulted about how best to meet department goals, and If goals in the department are
not met, employees could face negative job-related consequences. Response options
range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). See Appendix B.
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The adapted Productivity Climate Scale was found to be highly correlated with
customer service climate, but uncorrelated with employee safety motivation; higher
productivity climate was also found to predict a reduction in employee behavioral safety
compliance (Jiang & Probst, 2015). As this adapted Goals Climate Scale has not been
previously tested, there is not yet evidence for its convergent, discriminant, or predictive
validity.
Organizational identification.
Organizational identification was measured using Mael and Ashforth’s (1992)
six-item Organizational Identification scale (α = .92). Items include When I talk about
this company, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’, This company’s successes are my
successes, and When someone criticizes my company, it feels like a personal insult. Item
responses range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). See Appendix C.
Scores on Organizational Identification have been found to correlate highly with related
constructs such as satisfaction with one’s organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992) and
person-organization fit (Astakhova & Porter, 2015), and to be uncorrelated with unrelated
variables such as age, gender, and work-unit size (Gils et al., 2015). Additionally, scores
on Organization Identification has shown to predict job performance (Astakhova &
Porter, 2015), experienced job responsibility (Hannah et al., 2014), and willingness to
engage in UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015).
Ethical ideology.
Ethical ideology was measured by the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ;
Forsyth, 1980). The two dimensions of Idealism (α = .90) and Relativism (α = .87) are
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measured with 10 items each. Idealism items include If an action could harm an innocent
other, then it should not be done. Relativism items include What is ethical varies from
one situation and society to another. Responses are on a scale from 1 (Completely
disagree) to 9 (Completely agree). See Appendix D.
Forsyth (1980) recommended dichotomizing and crossing scores on the
Relativism and Idealism subscales to create a 2x2 taxonomy of ethical ideology styles;
while some studies have followed this approach (Allmon, Page, & Roberts, 2000; Barnett
et al., 1994), the majority of research using the EPQ has analyzed Relativism and
Idealism as two separate continuous variables (Cadogan et al., 2009; Henderson &
Kaplan, 2005; Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz, 2005; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Moore,
Detert, Klebe Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015).
When measured with variables related to moral decision making, the two
dimensions demonstrated opposite relationships: the Idealism dimension has been found
to negatively correlate with propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012), and
unethical intentions (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) and positively correlate with ethical
judgments (Pan & Sparks, 2012), while the Relativism dimension has produced
correlations of similar strength but in the opposite direction. Despite this, the two
dimensions have shown differential predictive validity regarding unethical workplace
behavior: while Idealism was found to negatively predict organizational deviance and
interpersonal deviance, Relativism showed no significant relationship with these
variables (Henle et al., 2005).
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Moral potency.
Moral potency was measured using the 12-item Moral Potency Questionnaire
(MPQ) from Hannah and Avolio (2010). The three dimensions within the measure are
Moral Ownership (3 items, α =.91), Moral Courage (4 items, α =.88), and Moral Efficacy
(5 items, α =.91). Moral Ownership items include I will assume responsibility to take
action when I see an unethical act. Moral Courage items include I will confront my peers
if they commit an unethical act. These two dimensions have a response scale from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Moral Efficacy items include I am confident
that I can readily see the moral/ethical implications in the challenges I face, answered on
a scale from 1 (Not at all confident) to 5 (Totally confident). The full scale will not be
included in the appendices due to the proprietory nature of this measure. See Appendix E
for more information. The MPQ has also used as as two-factor scale, as some past CFA
results have shown that a two factor structure combining Moral Ownership and Moral
Courage fit the data best (SRMR = .03, CFI = .98, NFI = .98; Hannah & Avolio, 2010).
That study also found that the two remaining first order factors reliability loaded onto a
single higher-order factor with good model fit. The MPQ overall score, as well as its
individual dimensions, have been found to be positively correlated with ethical actions
and intentions to report the unethical actions of others, and to negatively correlate with
tolerance of the mistreatment of others (Hannah & Avolio, 2010).
UPB.
Individual willingness to engage in UPB and department-wide prevalence of UPB
was measured with the 6-item scale developed by Umphress et al. (2010; α =.89).

55

Although originally designed to reflect an individual’s willingness to perform UPB, the
items can be adapted slightly to measure the overall frequency of UPB within the
department. Thus, the 6-item scale was used twice: once in its original form (Individual
UPB), and once adapted to reflect departmental UPB (Department UPB). Items from
Individual UPB include If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could
be damaging to my organization and If it would help my organization, I would
misrepresent the truth to make my organization look good, measured on a scale from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The adapted Department UPB version of these
items read How often do people in your department conceal information from the public
that could be damaging to the organization? and How often do people in your department
misrepresent the truth to make the organization look good?, measured on a scale from 1
(Never) to 7 (All the time). See Appendix F for the original UPB scale and Appendix G
for the adapted Department UPB version. Measuring two constructs at the same time
point using very similar item structure is likely to lead to increased common method
variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003); I will test for and statistically control for these effects
in my analysis.
Umphress et al. (2010) tested the UPB scale’s construct validity by comparing it
first to three measures of ethical and extra-role behavior and then to two measures of
unethical behavior. In both cases, comparative model tests using CFA indicated that the
factor structure retaining each existing scale as a unique factor was the best fit to the data.
The UPB measure correlated positively with extra-role behavior, organizational deviance,
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and interpersonal deviance, but was uncorrelated with interpersonal OCB or
organizational OCB.
Fear tolerance.
Engaging in UPB always carries the inherent risk of detection of potential
punishment; for this reason, it is possible that an individual employee’s level of fear
tolerance would influence their willingness to engage in UPB. To control for this, we will
measure participants’ fear tolerance with Norton and Weiss’ (2009) 12-item Courage
Measure (α = .92). Although the scale was originally conseptualized to measure courage,
the definition of courage used (“behavioral approach despite the experience of fear”) is
ideal for the purposes of measuring fear tolerance. For clarity in inturpretation, the
present study will refer to this scale as Fear Tolerance. Items from Fear Tolerance include
I will do things even though they seem to be dangerous and If the thought of something
makes me anxious, I usually will avoid it (Reverse-coded), rated from 1 (Never) to 7
(Always). See Appendix H.
Impression management.
As the present study will be requesting self-report information about participants’
unethical behavior, impression management bias is a concern (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Thus, I will include the 8-item Impression Management (IM) dimension (α =.80) from
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding short form (BIDR-16; Hart, Ritchie,
Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015). The IM factor captures a participants’ tendency towards
responding in such a way to appear more socially desirable. Items include Sometimes I
tell lies if I have to and I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back
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(reverse-scored), rated from 1 (Not true) to 7 (Very true). See Appendix I. Hart and
colleagues (2015) demonstrated that the BIDR-16 maintained CFA model fit equivalent
to the original BIDR, and found that the shorted subscales had high correlations with the
corresponding original scales (r = .84 for the IM dimension). Furthermore, the shorted
IM dimension was found to have moderate correlations with other measures of social
desirability and as well as agreeableness.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS

After screening for multivariate outliers in SPSS using Mahalanobis’ distance,
response time, and attention check responses, the data were imported into the structural
equation modeling program EQS. Of the 400 usable responses, 28 (7%) had missing data.
Forty-four data points (.102%) were missing out of a total of 43200 data points. The GLS
test of homogeneity of means was significant (χ2 = 3023.34, df = 2737, p < .05), which
indicates that the data are not missing completely at random (MCAR). Missing data were
computed with maximum likelihood imputation using the expectation maximization
algorithm.
Establishing the Final Measurement Model
Before evaluating descriptive statistics or testing hypotheses, the measurement
properties of all scales were evaluated through CFA and the data were tested for method
effects. The goal at this stage is to ensure that the model-implied relationships between
items and between scales fit the data well, based on the model Chi-square statistic, root
mean square residual (RMSEA), and the comparative fit index (CFI). For models with
high multivariate kurtosis (normalized estimate greater than 10), robust estimates of fit
were used (Curran & West, 1996). Poor model fit indicates that the survey items do not
accurately represent their respective constructs, or that the model-implied relationships
between constructs is inaccurate. Hypothesis testing using a poor fitting model can lead
to misinterpretation of the results.
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First, CFAs were conducted on individual scales to make initial adjustments to
improve model fit including dropping unreliable items, adding error covariances, or
adjusting factor structure where appropriate. All scales were then included in a single
model and a CFA was again used to assess model fit and make adjustments where
appropriate. Method effects were tested, as common method variance can affect dataimplied relationships between constructs and harm fit. After controlling for method
effects, the measurement properties of all items were again evaluated and problem items
were dropped. Finally, second order factors were considered for multi-factor scales. The
final measurement model demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(2627) = 3302.30, p < .001; CFI
= .97; RMSEA = .03). See Table 2 for description of each measurement model, Table 3
for fit statistics for all measurement models, and Table 4 for change in fit statistics
between relevant measurement models.
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Table 2: Overview of Measurement Models.
Subsection
Model Name
Evaluating Fit of Individual Scales Individual Scales-Original

Description
A CFA was conducted on each measure individually (ECI, UPB,
etc.) to check for fit and factor structure.

Individual Scales-Revised

Revised models for each individual scale. Revisions include
adding justifiable error covariances and cross-loadings, dropping
unreliable items, and making justifiable changes to factor
structure.

Combined-Original

A CFA was conducted on a model that combined the revised
versions of all substantive measures.

Combined-Revision 1

A revised version of Combined-Original. The only revision was
the addition of two cross-loadings.

Combined-IM-Original

Same as Combined-Original, but with the revised IM scale
included.

Combined-IM-Revision 1

A revised version of Combined-IM-Original. The same two
cross-loadings were added as in Combined-Revision 1. Also, 3
items with low reliability were removed from the IM scale,
leaving 5 IM items. 2 error covariances involving the dropped
items were also dropped.

Combined-Revision 1-ULMF

Same as Combined-Revision 1, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method
factor to control for common method variance.

Evaluating Fit of Combined
Model

Testing Method Effects
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection
Model Name
Testing Method Effects Continued Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base

Evaluating Fit of Combined
Model after Controlling Method
Effects

Testing Second Order Factors

Description
Same as Combined-IM-Revision 1, but the IM scale is fixed by
constraining the factor loadings and erorr variances of the IM
items to their values from Combined-Revision 1-IM and
constraining all factor covariances between the IM factor and
other factors to 0.

Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker

Same as Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base, but factor
loadings are added between the IM factor and all substantive
items.

Combined-Revision 2

Same as Combined-Revision 1, but with items dropped that had
dimensionality and/or reliability issues. Error covariances and
cross-loadings involving the dropped items are also dropped.

Combined-Revision 2-ULMF

Same as Combined-Revision 2, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method
factor to control for common method variance.

Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker

Same as Combined-Revision 2, but with the fixed IM factor
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for
common method bias.

Combined-ECI L2

Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 6 ECI factors are loaded
onto a single higher-order factor.

Combined-ECI L2-ULMF

Same as Combined-ECI L2, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method
factor to control for common method variance.
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection
Testing Second Order Factors
Continued

Model Name
Combined-IM-ECI L2-Marker

Description
Same as Combined-ECI L2, but with the fixed IM factor
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for
common method bias.

Combined-MC L2

Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 2 MC factors are loaded
onto a single L2 factor.

Combined-MC L2-ULMF

Same as Combined-MC L2, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method
factor to control for common method variance.

Combined-IM-MC L2-Marker

Same as Combined-MC L2, but with the fixed IM factor
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for
common method bias.

Combined-Goals L2

Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 2 goals climate factors
are loaded onto a single L2 factor.

Combined-Goals L2-ULMF

Same as Combined-Goals L2, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method
factor to control for common method variance.

Combined-IM-Goals L2-Marker

Same as Combined-Goals L2, but with the fixed IM factor
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for
common method bias.
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection
Final Measurement Model

Model Name
Final Measurement Model

Description
Same as Combined-Revision 2, but with the 6 ECI factors
loaded onto a single L2 factor and with the 2 MC factors loaded
onto a single L2 factor.

Final Measurement Model-ULMF

Same as the Final Measurement Model, but factor loadings are
added between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent
method factor to control for common method variance.

Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker

Same as the Final Measurement Model, but with the fixed IM
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to control
for common method bias.
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Table 3: Fit Statistics for Measurement Models.
Fit Statistics
Subsection
Evaluating Fit of Individual
Scales

Evaluating Fit of Combined
Model

Testing Method Effects

Evaluating Fit of Combined
Model after Controlling
Method Effects

Model Name
ECI-Original
ECI-Revised
Goals Climate-Original
Goals Climate-Revised
Organizational Identification-Original
Organizational Identification-Revised
UPB-Original
UPB-Revised
MPQ-Original
MPQ-Revised
EPQ-Original
EPQ-Revised
Fear Tolerance-Original
Fear Tolerance-Revised
IM-Original
IM-Revised
Combined-Original
Combined-Revision 1
Combined-IM-Original
Combined-IM-Revision 1
Combined-Revision 1-ULMF
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker
Combined-Revision 2
Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker Base
Combined-Revision 2-ULMF
Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker

Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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χ2
399.64
281.08
1242.12
273.32
42.97
38.83
318.53
202.94
291.72
145.10
791.31
128.86
368.22
88.62
169.63
76.74
5561.04
5497.82
6677.95
6147.14
5055.72
6320.44
6032.42
3942.17
4677.05
3622.53

S-B χ
290.22
205.67
811.53
225.28
29.45
25.42
202.46
135.20
169.97
92.213
676.41
109.12
292.95
69.14
125.89
58.09
4670.52
4598.30
5679.29
5154.48
4280.39
5347.99
5081.20
3281.14
3936.02
3037.07

df
137
133
65
57
9
8
53
48
51
47
169
72
54
32
20
18
3419
3417
4109
3836
3331
3862
3776
2635
3030
2559

p
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
.001
.001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001

CFI
.97
.99
.69
.93
.98
.99
.94
.96
.96
.98
.85
.98
.89
.98
.85
.94
.95
.95
.94
.94
.96
.94
.94
.97
.96
.98

RMSEA
.05
.04
.17
.09
.07
.07
.08
.07
.08
.05
.09
.04
.11
.05
.12
.08
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.02

4410.85

3694.75

2954

> .001

.96

.03

2

Table 3 Continued.
Fit Statistics
Subsection
Model Name
Testing Second Order Factors Combined-ECI L2
Combined-ECI L2-ULMF
Combined-IM-ECI L2-Marker
Combined-MC L2
Combined-MC L2-ULMF
Combined-IM-MC L2-Marker
Combined-Goals L2
Combined-Goals L2-ULMF
Combined-IM-Goals L2-Marker
Final Measurement Model
Final Measurement Model
Final Measurement Model-ULMF
Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker Base
Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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χ2
4221.35
3922.26
4684.11
3992.08
3669.16
4459.07
4056.21
3741.42
4525.15
4254.28
3952.91
4989.03

S-B χ
3512.10
3277.40
3921.75
3321.41
3072.00
3726.95
3377.52
3139.13
3791.62
3538.56
3302.30
4174.77

df
2693
2618
3012
2649
2571
2966
2649
2573
2968
2702
2627
3097

p
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001

CFI
.96
.97
.96
.97
.98
.96
.97
.97
.96
.96
.97
.95

RMSEA
.03
.03
.03
.03
.02
.03
.03
.02
.03
.03
.03
.03

4714.61

3945.14

3021

> .001

.95

.03

2

Table 4: Change in Fit for Measurement Models.

More Restrictive Model
Individual Scales
ECI Original
Goals Climate Original
Org. Ident. Original
UPB Original
Moral Potency Original
EPQ Original
Fear Tolerance Original
IM Original
Measurement Model Revisions
Combined Original
Combined Revision 1
Combined Original-Marker Measurement
Combined Revision 1-Marker Base
Combined Original
Method Effects Testing
Combined Revision 1
Combined Revision 1-Marker Base
Combined Revision 2
Combined Revision 2-Marker Base
Final Measurement
Final Measurement-IM-Marker Base

Less Restrictive Model
ECI Revised
Goals Climate Revised
Org. Ident. Revised
UPB Revised
Moral Potency Revised
EPQ Revised
Fear Tolerance Revised
IM Revised
Combined Revision 1
Combined Revision 2
Combined Revision 1-Marker Measurement
Combined Revision 2-Marker Base
Final Measurement
Combined Revision 1-ULMC
Combined Revision 1-Marker
Combined Revision 2-ULMC
Combined Revision 2-Marker
Final Measurement-ULMF
Final Measurement-IM-Marker

Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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Δ χ2 Δ df

Change in Fit
p value Δ CFI Δ RMSEA

79.71
255.51
4.54
50.99
43.20
570.24
229.02
58.061

4
8
1
5
4
97
22
2

< .001
< .001
< .05
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

.014
.240
.006
.027
.027
.137
.091
.093

.016
.091
.013
.017
.027
.051
.051
.040

8.70
1322.91
564.31
1418.67
1139.32

2
782
273
832
717

< .05
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

.003
.019
.006
.016
.013

.001
.005
.001
.004
.003

251.67
310.95
213.93
273.68
217.44
229.63

86
86
76
76
76
76

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

.011
.005
.008
.008
.008
.008

.004
.002
.003
.002
.003
.002

Table 4 Continued.
Model Comparisons
More Restrictive Model
Second Order Factor Testing
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2-ULMC
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2-Marker
Combined Revision 2 MP L2
Combined Revision 2 MP L2-ULMC
Combined Revision 2 MP L2-Marker
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2ULMC
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2Marker

Less Restrictive Model

Δ χ2 Δ df

Change in Fit
p value Δ CFI Δ RMSEA

Combined Revision 2

228.12

59

< .001

.008

.003

Combined Revision 2-ULMC
Combined Revision 2-Marker
Combined Revision 2
Combined Revision 2-ULMC
Combined Revision 2-Marker
Combined Revision 2
Combined Revision 2-ULMC

218.82
223.29
38.74
30.30
26.17
103.39
115.85

59
59
14
14
14
14
14

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .01
< .05
< .001
< .001

.008
.008
.001
.001
.001
.004
.004

.003
.003
.000
.000
.000
.001
.001

Combined Revision 2-Marker

102.18

14

< .001

.004

.001

Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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Evaluating fit of individual scales.
Individual Scales-Original.
Fit and factor structure were first modeled separately for each substantive
measure and for the measured method variable IM using CFA. For each measure, all
items were loaded onto their respective latent factors and all factors were allowed to
covary. The measurement properties of the factors and their indicators were evaluated
based on the Chi-square statistic, CFI, RMSEA, factor loadings and factor correlations.
Individual Scales-Revised.
After modeling each measure using the original factor structure, the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test was used to identify sources of misfit. Item cross-loadings and error
covariances that would significantly improve model fit were considered, provided there
was a theoretical basis for including the additional parameters. Between the 102 total
items making up the eight measured scales, a total of 27 error covariances and four crossloadings were added 3. Eight items with factor loadings under .6 were dropped at this
stage due to their low reliability. Items with dimensionality issues (multiple crossloadings or error covariances) were retained and were reconsidered for removal after
controlling for method effects.
Goals Climate Scale factor structure.
When modeling the Goals Climate Scale, poor fit (S-B χ2(65) = 811.53, p < .001;
CFI = .69; RMSEA = .17) and the pattern of error covariances identified by the LM test
3

Error covariances were justified based on similarities in item wording or subject matter, and crossloadings were added based on substantive item overlap between factor constructs. Many of these crossloadings and error covariances were dropped in later models after items with dimensionality issues were
dropped.
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indicated a need to revise factor structure. The thirteen item measure was expected to
contain a single factor because it was adapted from a single-factor Productivity Climate
Scale (Jiang & Probst, 2015) which in turn had been adapted from a single-factor Safety
Climate Scale (Neal et al., 2000). The single-factor structure of the Safety Climate Scale
had demonstrated good fit, but the factor structure of the Productivity Climate Scale had
not been rigorously tested: a CFA conducted by Jiang and Probst (2015) indicated a
single factor, but this CFA had used three item parcels rather than the thirteen individual
items due to concerns over small sample size.
For the current study, the pattern of error covariances revealed by the LM test on
the Goals Climate Scale-Original model indicated a two-factor structure; one factor
contained items related to compelling employees to pursue department goals through
management pressure and established consequences (If goals in the department are not
met, employees could face negative job-related consequences; The main focus in my
department is on meeting goals. Everything else is secondary) and one factor contained
items related to empowering employees to work towards departmental goals by getting
employees involved in goals achievement strategies (Employees in my department are
able to discuss goal achievement issues in meetings) and training employees to be better
equipped to achieve department goals (Employees in my department receive
comprehensive training regarding how best to meet their goals). The new two-factor
structure significantly improved the fit of the scale over the original factor structure
(Scaled Δ S-B χ2(8) = 255.51, p < .001; Δ CFI = .24; Δ RMSEA = .09). Also, based on
the content of the items, it is reasonable to argue that the two factors capture two distinct
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aspects of goals climate, which I will refer to as pressuring goals climate and
empowering goals climate. The subscales to measure these two goals climate dimensions
will be called Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment. See Table 5 for details on the
factor restructuring.
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Table 5: Factor Restructoring of Goals Climate Scale.

1

Goals Pressure
Management in my department places a strong emphasis on
meeting goals.

1

2

The achieving of goals drives most decisions at my department.

2

Employees in my department are able to discuss goal
achievement issues in meetings.

3

Meeting goals is a top priority of the management in my
department.

3

Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how
best to meet department goals.

4

The main focus in my department is on meeting goals.
Everything else is secondary.

4

How to meet department goals is given high priority in training
programs for employees in my department.

5

Performance evaluations for employees in my department are
primarily based on whether employees did their part to help the
company meet goals.

5

Employees in my department receive comprehensive training
regarding how best to meet their goals.

6

If goals in the department are not met, employees could face
negative job-related consequences.

6

Training programs for employees in my department primarily
focus on how to achieve goals.

7

Management in my department praises employees that help the
company meet goals.
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Goals Empowerment
There is frequent communication about issues related to meeting
goals in my department.

MPQ factor structure.
Although the MPQ demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(51) = 169.97, p < .001; CFI =
.96; RMSEA = .08) with the original three factor structure, the very high factor
correlation between the Moral Ownership and Moral Courage factors (r = .93, p < .001)
indicated potential problems with discriminant validity (Brown, 2006). This same
problem had been observed in past studies, and the authors of the scale concluded that the
two factors in question were similar enough that it was justifiable to combine them into a
single factor (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). Thus, for this study we combined the Moral
Ownership and Moral Courage factors into a single Moral Ownership & Courage factor,
leaving the MPQ scale with two factors.
Evaluating fit of combined model.
Combined-Original.
After the revisions were made to the individual scales, all substantive scales were
included in a single model and overall model fit was reexamined. As the IM scale will be
used as a method factor in certain subsequent models but not in others, there were two
versions of the original measurement model with all scales combined: one without the IM
scale (Combined-Original; S-B χ2(3419) = 4670.52, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .03)
and one with the IM scale (Combined-IM-Original; S-B χ2(4109) = 5679.29, p < .001;
CFI = .94; RMSEA = .03).
Combined-Revision 1.
The LM test was used to identify sources model misfit in the Combined-Original
and Combined-IM-Original models, this time between items of separate measures. Two
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between-scale cross-loadings were added to Combined-Original, creating CombinedRevision 1. The revisions significantly improved model fit, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(2) = 8.70, p
< .05; Δ CFI = .003; Δ RMSEA = .001). The same two cross-loadings were added to
Combined-IM-Original. Also, three IM items were removed as they were found to have
low reliability within the context of the combined model. Two error covariances
involving the dropped items were also dropped. These changes created model CombinedIM-Revision 1, which had significantly improved model fit compared to Combined-IMOriginal, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(273) = 564.31, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01; Δ RMSEA = .001).
Testing method effects.
This study was susceptible to possible method effects for many reasons. First,
because the survey is self-report, taken at a single time point, and comprised
predominately of Likert-scale items, common method variance is a serious concern
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, the sensitive topic of unethical pro-organizational
behavior and even organizational ethical climate raise the possibility of common method
bias attributable to impression management. Although the study assured participants of
their confidentiality to reduce evaluation apprehension and used a counterbalanced
survey design to reduce item context effects, these procedures alone are unlikely to be
sufficient in controlling for all possible method effects. In order to test for and control
potential method effects, two statistical techniques were also used: an unmeasured latent
method factor (ULMF) and the CFA marker variable technique (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
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Combined-Revision 1-ULMF.
To test for common method variance, an unmeasured latent method factor was
added to model Combined-Revision 1 to create model Combined-Revision 1-ULMF. All
items were allowed to load onto their respective substantive factors as well as to the
unmeasured latent method factor, and all substantive factors were allowed to covary.
Factor correlations between substantive factors and the unmeasured latent method were
constrained to be zero for statistical identification purposes (Williams & Hartman, 2010).
The addition of the unmeasured latent method factor significantly improved the model fit
of Combined-Revision 1-ULMF compared to Combined-Revision 1 (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(86)
= 251.67, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01; Δ RMSEA = .004), indicating the presence of common
method variance. Based on this evidence, hypothesis testing will be conducted with and
without the unmeasured latent method factor to ensure that any significant findings
cannot be explained by common method variance.
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker.
The CFA marker technique was used to test for common method bias due to
impression management (Williams & O’Boyle, 2015). In order to keep the interpretation
of the IM method factor constant across all subsequent tests for common method bias, the
IM factor loadings and error variances were fixed to their observed values in CombinedIM-Revision 1. This is necessary before loading all substantive items onto the IM factor
in order to ensure that the marker variable only extracts shared variance related to
impression management from the substantive items. In other words, the IM method factor
extracts the meaning of the impression management construct from the measured IM
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items and then is able to extract shared variance caused by impression management from
the substantive items. Correlations between substantive latent factors and the IM factor
were constrained to zero in order for the subsequent models to be properly statistically
identified. These steps established a baseline model (Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker
Base) to serve as a benchmark comparison against the subsequent tests of common
method bias.
After the model Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base was established, IM
method factor loadings were added to each substantive item, creating the model
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker. Adding the method factor loadings to the substantive
items significantly improved the model fit of Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker compared
to Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(86) = 310.95, p < .001; Δ CFI
= .01; Δ RMSEA = .002), indicating the presence of common method bias due to
impression management. Based on these results, hypothesis testing will be conducted
with and without the IM marker variable to ensure that any significant findings cannot be
explained by common method bias.
Evaluating fit of combined model after controlling method effects.
Combined-Revision 2.
All items were again examined based on their measurement properties before and
after controlling for method effects, using models Combined-Revision 1, CombinedRevision 1-ULMF, and Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker. Within these three models,
items were evaluated based on their substantive factor loadings, method factor loadings,
cross-loadings, and error covariances. Considering all of these measurement properties,
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problem items were identified and dropped. An additional 10 items were dropped from
all model versions, which allowed for the removal of five cross-loadings and eight error
covariances. These changes resulted in models Combined-Revision 2, Combined-Revision
2-ULMF, and Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker. The revisions significantly improved
model fit: Combined-Revision 2 compared to Combined-Revision 1 (Scaled Δ S-B
χ2(782) = 1322.91, p < .001; Δ CFI = .02; Δ RMSEA = .01), Combined-Revision 2ULMC compared to Combined-Revision 1-ULMC (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(772) = 1254.36, p <
.001; Δ CFI = .02; Δ RMSEA = .004), and Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker compared to
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(822) = 1393.77, p < .001; Δ CFI =
.02; Δ RMSEA = .004). See Table 6 for a list of all dropped items, with explanations for
each.
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Table 6: List of Dropped Items.
Item
Goals Climate
Goals Pressure-4

Item Text

Explanation

The main focus in my department is on meeting goals. This item had multidimensionality issues as evidenced by
Everything else is secondary.
an error covariance and the between-scale cross-loading,
and controlling for method effects did not help to reduce
the multidimensionality issues.

Goals Pressure-5

Performance evaluations for employees in my
This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .50) and
department are primarily based on whether employees multidimensionality issues as shown by a cross-loading and
did their part to help the company meet goals.
error covariance.

Goals Pressure-6

If goals in the department are not met, employees
could face negative job-related consequences.

Goals Empowerment-1

There is frequent communication about issues related This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .44) and
to meeting goals in my department.
multidimensionality issues as shown by its cross-loading.

Goals Empowerment-5

Employees in my department receive comprehensive This item had measurement issues as evidenced by its
training regarding how best to meet their goals.
multiple error covariances. It also had dimensionality issues
with other scales that were not controled for because there
was no reasonable theoretical rationale for adding any crossloadings.
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This item had low reliability (Item loading = .51) and
dimensionality issues based on its error covariance.

Table 6 Continued.
Item
EPQ Scale
Idealism-7

Idealism-9

Item Text

Explanation

Deciding whether or not to perform an act by
Low Reliability (Item loading = .329)
balancing the positive consequences of the act against
the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others. Low Reliability (Item loading = .555)

Idealism-10

Moral actions are those which closely match the
ideals of the most “perfect” action.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .390)

Relativism-1

There are no ethical principles that are so important
that they should be part of any code of ethics.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .377)

Relativism-9

No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether Low Reliability (Item loading = .515)
a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends
on the situation.

Relativism-10

Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral
Low Reliability (Item loading = .471)
depends on the circumstances surrounding the action.

MPQ Scale
Moral Efficacy-1

I am confident that I can confront others who behave This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .42) and
unethically to resolve the issue.
multidimensionality issues as shown by a between-scale
cross-loading.
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Table 6 Continued.
Item
UPB Scale
Individual UPB-4

Item Text

Explanation

If my organization needed me to, I would give a good This item had dimensionality issues based on its betweenrecommendation on the behalf of an incompetent
factor error covariance.
employee in the hope that the person will become
another organization’s problem instead of my own.

Individual UPB-5

If my organization needed me to, I would withhold
issuing a refund to a customer or client accidentally
overcharged.

This item had low reliability (Item loading = .52) and
dimensionality issues based on its between-factor error
covariance.

Department UPB-4

Employees in my company have given a good
recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent
employee in the hope that the person will become
another organization’s problem.

This item had low reliability based on its low factor loading
(Item loading = .54) and dimensionality issues based on its
cross-factor error covariance.

Department UPB-5

Employees in my department have withheld issuing a This item had low reliability (Item loading = .53) and
refund to a customer or client accidentally
dimensionality issues based on its between-factor error
overcharged.
covariance.

Fear Tolerance Scale
Fear Tolerance-7

Fear Tolerance-12

I will do things even though they seem to be
dangerous.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .465)

I will not face something I fear, even if avoiding it
will have a negative outcome for me.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .457)
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Table 6 Continued.
Item

Item Text

Explanation

IM Scale
Impression Management-5 I have said something bad about a friend behind his or Low Reliability (Item loading = .442)
her back.
Impression Management-6 When I hear people talking privately, I avoid
listening.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .459)

Impression Management-8 I don’t gossip about other people’s business.

Low Reliability (Item loading = .460)
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Testing second order factors.
Next, second order factors were considered for the ECI, MPQ, and the Goals
Climate Scale. For each, the overall model fit was examined before and after creating a
second order factor. Other issues were also considered, such as theoretical justification,
second order factor loadings, and the potential improvements to model parsimony.
ECI.
The factors within the ECI were formulated to capture collective ethical climate
perceptions as they relate to each of the components of Rest’s (1986) model for ethical
decision making. Rest’s theory states that each of the ethical decision making steps are
reflected in the final ethical decision; the authors of the ECI use this logic to argue that
conceptually, the six ECI factors are all highly related but distinct dimensions of ethical
climate which together explain the overall ethical climate construct (Arnaud, 2010). This
is theoretical justification for use of a second order ECI factor.
Several past empirical studies have also found the six ECI factors to be highly
intercorrelated, although no previous studies were found that have used the ECI as a
single second order factor. The ECI factor intercorrelations in the present study were also
found to be high (M = .74, SD = .10), and were not reduced by controlling for method
effects with the unmeasured latent method factor or marker variable (M = .74, SD = .10).
For this study, the use of a second order factor for the ECI would greatly improve model
parsimony and would make the interpretation of hypothesis testing results much simpler.
By reducing the number of required factor covariances, a second order ECI factor would
result in a net increase of 59 degrees of freedom for the measurement model. A second
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order ECI factor would also reduce the number of exogenous variables in the overall
model by five, and reduce the number of hypotheses to test by thirty-five 4. Creating a
second order ECI factor did harm the fit of the overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(59) =
228.12, p < .001). The robust CFI indicated a trivial harm in overall fit (Δ CFI = .008);
changes of over .01 in CFI are considered to be significant (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).
The ECI second order factor loadings were all well within the acceptable range (γ = .77 –
.98), indicating good reliability of the first order factors in representing the second order
factor. It was determined that the slight reduction in overall fit caused by creating a
second order ECI factor was justifiable considering the benefits to parsimony and the
demonstrated reliabilities of the first order factors.
MPQ.
Past research has provided theoretical and statistical justification that the
individual factors within the MPQ are all elements of an overall moral potency construct
(Hannah & Avolio, 2010). This past research used the MPQ as a single second order
factor and demonstrated that this factor structure fit the data well. The data from the
present study shows the Moral Ownership & Courage and the Moral Efficacy factor to be
highly correlated (r = .77, p < .001). Creating a second order MPQ factor results in a net
increase of 14 degrees of freedom for the measurement model, reduces the number of
exogenous factors by one, and reduces the number of hypotheses to test by three. The two
first order MPQ factors both loaded reliably onto the second order factor (γ = .86; γ =
.89). The creation of the second order MPQ factor did significantly harm the fit of the
4

Without the second order ECI factor, the seven hypotheses involving the ECI would each have to be
conducted six times.
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overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(14) = 38.74, p < .001), although harm to fit was reduced
when controlling for method effects with the unmeasured latent method factor (S-B
χ2(14) = 30.30, p < .01) and with the marker variable (S-B χ2(14) = 26.17, p < .05).
Reductions in robust CFI (Δ CFI = .001) indicated a trivial amount of harm to overall fit.
Based on these justifications, the two MPQ first order factors were combined into a
second order factor for use in the structural model.
Goals Climate Scale.
The Goals Climate Scale was expected to be a single factor, but the factor
structure was adapted after CFA results indicated that the scale contained two distinct but
correlated factors. It is possible that the two first order goals climate factors could operate
as a single second order factor, but there is limited information to use as justification. The
goals climate scale was adapted from a productivity climate scale which in turn was
adapted from a safety climate scale, and the current variation has never been used before.
The Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment factors were found to be moderately
correlated (r = .65, p < .001). The use of a second order Goals Climate factor would
result in a net increase of 14 degrees of freedom for the measurement model, reduce
exogenous variables by one, and reduce the number of hypotheses to test by seven. The
two first order Goals Climate factors both loaded reliably onto the second order factor (γ
= .76; γ = .84). The creation of the second order goals climate factor did significantly
harmed the fit of the overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(14) = 103.39, p < .001) although the
harm to the robust CFI was trivial (Δ CFI = .004). The harm to fit relative to increased
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degrees of freedom was more severe for the second order Goals Climate than for the
second order ECI or the second order MPQ.
Based on the lack of theoretical justification and the statistical evidence against a
second order factor, Goals Climate will not be used as a second order factor; instead, the
hypotheses involving Goals Climate will each be tested independently for Goals Pressure
and for Goals Empowerment. This will affect seven hypotheses: H3a (goals climate
predicting individual UPB), H3b (goals climate predicting department UPB), H4a (ethical
climate*goals climate predicting individual UPB), H4b (ethical climate*goals climate
predicting department UPB), H6b (relativism*goals climate predicting individual UPB),
H7b (idealism*goals climates predicting individual UPB), and H9b (moral potency*goals
climate predicting individual UPB). Each will be split into versions one and two (e.g.
H4a-1 and H4a-2), with version one using Goals Pressure and version two using Goals
Empowerment.
Final Measurement Model.
The Final Measurement Model is the same as the Combined-Revision 2 model,
but with the six ECI factors loaded onto a single second order factor and the two MPQ
factors loaded onto a second order factor. The Final Measurement Model has 81 items,
16 first order factors, and two second order factors. Out of the original 102 items, 18
substantive items and three marker indicator items were dropped, 17 error covariances
were added, and one cross-loading was added. The Final Measurement Model
demonstrates good fit (S-B χ2(2702) = 3538.56, p < .001 CFI = .96, RMSEA = .03) and
significantly improved fit over the original model, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(717)= 1139.32, p <
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.001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ RMSEA = .003). Additionally, two techniques for controlling
method effects significantly improved the fit compared to the baseline: an unmeasured
latent method factor (Final Measurement Model-ULMF; Scaled Δ S-B χ2(76) = 217, p <
.001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ RMSEA = .003) and the CFA marker variable technique (Final
Measurement Model-IM-Marker; Scaled Δ S-B χ2(76) = 229.63, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ
RMSEA = .002). The subsequent structural models used for hypothesis testing will each
be conducted three times, once with the unmeasured latent method factor, once with the
marker variable, and once without controlling for method effects. See Table 7 for means,
SDs, composite reliabilities, and correlations for all measures.
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Table 7: Means, SDs, Composite Reliabilities, and Correlations.

ECI
Org Ident.
UPB
Dept. UPB
Idealism
Relativism
MPQ
Goals Pres.
Goals Emp.
Fear Tol.

Mean
5.90
4.10
2.41
3.02
7.26
4.99
6.63
5.77
5.03
4.72

SD
1.70
1.68
1.33
1.53
1.59
1.75
1.55
1.27
1.39
1.21

ECI
.94 (.72)
.58***
-.18***
-.62***
.15**
.00
.46***
.14*
.59***
.30***

Org Idt.

UPB

D. UPB

Idealism Relativ.

MPQ

.92 (.82)
.20***
-.26***
.12*
.00
.30***
.04
.35***
.21***

.88 (.81)
.37***
-.35***
.11*
-.47***
-.13*
-.08
-.26***

.90 (.83)
-.09
.05
-.38***
-.03
-.29***
-.22***

.92 (.78)
-.07
.45***
.26***
.21***
.13*

.94 (.72)
.26*** .93 (.91)
.41*** .65*** .87 (.76)
.65*** .21*** .24*** .92 (.74)

.88 (.72)
-.11*
-.03
-.02
-.06

Note: Correlations are before controlling for method effects. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
Factor composite reliabilities (Rho) are on the diagonal, with square root of AVE in parentheses.
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Goals P. Goals E. Fear Tol.

Structural Models
The complete structural model was built in stages, with the majority of hypothesis
testing occurring in the Final Model. First, hypothesized main effects were added to the
Final Measurement Model, creating the model Main Effects-Original. Next, additional
unhypothesized main effects were added as indicated by the LM test, creating the model
Main Effects-Revised. Then, hypothesized multiplicative effects (interactions and
quadratic effects) were assessed by adding one multiplicative effect at a time to the Main
Effects-Revised model. This created a series of Individual Multiplicative Effects models,
each including one hypothesized multiplicative effect. Multiplicative effects with
nonsignificant parameter estimates in the Individual Multiplicative Effects models were
considered not supported and were not tested further. The four hypothesized
multiplicative effects with significant parameter estimates were then all added to the
Main Effects-Revised model and tested together in the model Cumulative Multiplicative
Effects. The three multiplicative effects that remained significant in the Cumulative
Multiplicative Effects model were included in the Final Model. Due to extreme levels of
multivariate kurtosis, composite multiplicative factors were used for multiplicative
effects involving the ECI in models Cumulative Multiplicative Effects and Final Model.
Hypothesized main effects with significant parameter estimates in the Final
Model were considered supported. Hypothesized multiplicative effects had to
demonstrate significant parameter estimates in the Individual Multiplicative Effects
models, the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model, and the Final Model to be
considered supported. See Table 8 for an overview of all structural models, Table 9 for fit
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statistics for all structural models, and Table 10 for comparisons in model fit between
relevant structural models.
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Table 8: Overview of Structural Models.
Subsection
Establishing Main Effects

Model Name
Main Effects-Original

Description
Final Measurement, but with structural paths added for
hypothesized main effects. Linear paths also added to
prepare for hypothesized quadratic effects. All factor
covariances are removed (constrained to zero) for the 3
newly endogenous dependent variables.

Main Effects-Original-ULMF

Same as the Main Effects-Original, but factor loadings
are added between all substantive items and an
unmeasured latent method factor to control for common
method variance.

Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker

Same as the Main Effects-Original, but with the fixed IM
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to
control for common method bias.

Main Effects-Revised

Revised version of Main Effects-Original. 5 additional
linear main effect paths were added based on those
indicated by the LM test.

Main Effects-Revised-ULMF

Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but factor loadings are
added between all substantive items and an unmeasured
latent method factor to control for common method
variance.
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Table 8 Continued.
Subsection
Establishing Main Effects Continued

Model Name
Main Effects-IM-Revised-Marker

Description
Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but with the fixed IM
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to
control for common method bias.

Testing Multiplicative Effects

Individual Multiplicative Effects

Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but with 1
multiplicative latent variable included to test 1
hypothesized interaction or quadratic effect. This is
conducted for each of the hypothesized interactions and
quadratic effects.

Individual Multiplicative Effects-ULMF Each individual multiplicative effect is also tested with
factor loadings added between all substantive items and
an unmeasured latent method factor to control for
common method variance.

Individual Multiplicative Effects-IMMarker

Each individual multiplicative effect is tested, but with
the fixed IM factor included and loading onto all
substantive items to control for common method bias.

Cumulative Multiplicative Effects

The 4 supported hypotheses from the Individual
Multiplicative Effects models are tested together in 1
model, but the 2 multiplicative effects involving the ECI
are first converted to composites.
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Table 8 Continued.
Subsection
Model Name
Testing Multiplicative Effects Continued Cumulative Multiplicative EffectsULMF

Final Model

Description
Same as Cumulative Multiplicative Effects, but factor
loadings are added between all substantive items and an
unmeasured latent method factor to control for common
method variance.

Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-IMMarker

Same as Cumulative Multiplicative Effects, but with the
fixed IM factor included and loading onto all substantive
items to control for common method bias.

Final Model

The 3 multiplicative effects that were supported in the
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model are tested
together in 1 model.

Final Model-ULMF

Same as Final Model, but factor loadings are added
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent
method factor to control for common method variance.

Final Model-IM-Marker

Same as Final Model, but with the fixed IM factor
included and loading onto all substantive items to control
for common method bias.
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Table 9: Fit of Structural Models.
Fit Statistics
Model
Main Effects-Original
Main Effects-Original-ULMF
Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker
Main Effects-Revised
Main Effects-Revised-ULMF
Main Effects-IM-Revised-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-IM-Marker

Phase
Main Effects Testing

Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.

93

χ2
4274.75
3991.64
4725.01
4167.86
3939.29
4624.20
7677.24
7230.20
8214.83
7686.77
7241.02
8224.34
7487.07
7218.76
8063.52
7710.15
7068.17
8278.45
7498.11
7229.03
8071.27

S-B χ
3557.37
3333.60
3954.76
3469.26
3290.75
3872.69
6213.00
5897.37
6882.00
6220.17
5905.58
6892.51
5554.21
5354.84
6199.60
5887.29
5463.76
6674.04
5566.95
5366.04
6204.42
2

df
2713
2642
3031
2708
2637
3026
4201
4108
4592
4201
4108
4592
4197
4108
4592
4200
4108
4592
4197
4108
4592

p
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001

CFI
.96
.97
.95
.96
.97
.96
.91
.92
.91
.91
.92
.91
.92
.92
.92
.91
.93
.91
.92
.93
.92

RMSEA
.028
.027
.028
.025
.025
.026
.035
.033
.033
.035
.033
.034
.028
.028
.028
.032
.029
.032
.029
.031
.028

Table 9 Continued.
Fit Statistics
Phase
Model
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2
Continued
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-IM-Marker
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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χ2
7710.06
7068.14
8278.43
7751.83
7038.60
8312.33
4488.71
4255.53
5001.71
4518.49
4276.45
5009.19
4530.98
4297.15
5032.38
7606.00
7135.92
8169.07
4544.48
4313.87
5043.70

S-B χ2
5887.04
5463.29
6673.56
6307.20
5587.96
6861.70
3723.35
3541.98
4175.20
3745.26
3563.88
4179.46
3778.64
3598.96
4223.46
5658.78
5367.07
6400.22
3802.02
3569.44
4190.19

df
4200
4108
4592
4197
4108
4592
2928
2854
3263
2928
2854
3263
2928
2854
3263
4197
4108
4592
2928
2854
3263

p
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001

CFI
.91
.93
.91
.91
.94
.91
.96
.97
.95
.96
.97
.95
.96
.96
.95
.93
.94
.93
.96
.97
.95

RMSEA
.032
.029
.032
.034
.030
.033
.026
.025
.026
.026
.025
.027
.027
.026
.027
.030
.028
.029
.026
.025
.027

Table 9 Continued.
Fit Statistics
Phase
Model
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2
Continued
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-IM-Marker
Cumulative Multiplicative EffectsCumulative Multiplicative Effects
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-ULMF
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-IM-Marker
Final Results
Final Model
Final Model-ULMF
Final Model-IM-Marker
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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χ2
4542.91
4310.99
5044.56
4462.89
4229.75
4966.81
4944.89
4712.66
5472.49
5014.34
4784.46
5539.60
5081.52
4812.51
5596.92
8314.33
7835.72
8893.63
6988.00
6586.55
7627.44

S-B χ
3788.48
3567.56
4295.10
3744.45
3519.33
4255.16
4084.53
3854.3
4613.58
4064.11
3836.05
4592.14
4185.83
3918.36
4702.71
6754.25
6280.63
7337.21
5577.89
5307.73
6163.23
2

df
2928
2854
3263
2928
2854
3263
3164
3088
3512
3164
3087
3511
3164
3087
3511
4744
4644
5159
4183
4094
4579

p
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001
> .001

CFI
.96
.97
.95
.96
.97
.96
.96
.96
.95
.96
.96
.95
.95
.96
.95
.92
.93
.92
.93
.94
.93

RMSEA
.026
.026
.027
.025
.024
.025
.026
.025
.027
.026
.025
.027
.027
.026
.027
.031
.030
.032
.029
.027
.029

Table 10: Change in Fit for Structural Models.
Model Comparisons
Less Restrictive Model

More Restrictive Model
Main Effects Revisions
Main Effects Original
Main Effects Original-ULMC
Main Effects Original-Marker

Δ χ2

Main Effects Revised
Main Effects Revised-ULMC
Main Effects Revised-Marker

78.62
38.37
75.26

Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
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Change in Fit
Δ df
p value
5
5
5

< .001
< .001
< .001

Δ CFI Δ RMSEA
.004
.002
.004

.001
.001
.002

Establishing main effects.
Main Effects-Original.
The first structural model (Main Effects-Original) added linear paths to the Final
Measurement Model as specified in the proposed model. Three linear regression
equations were added: (1) ECI predicting Organizational Identification, (2) ECI and
Goals Climate Scale predicting Department UPB, and (3) ECI, Goals Climate Scale,
Department UPB, Organizational Identification, Relativism, Idealism, MPQ, and Fear
Tolerance predicting Individual UPB. Because the Goals Climate Scale resulted in a twofactor structure, paths were added from both Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment to
predict Individual UPB and Department UPB. For the hypotheses proposing curvilinear
effects (ECI predicting Individual UPB and Department UPB), linear paths were added at
this stage in order for the subsequent quadratic paths to be properly statistically specified.
Main Effects-Original demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(2713) = 3557.37, p < .001; CFI =
.96, RMSEA = .03).
Main Effects-Revised.
The LM test was used to determine whether any additional main effect paths
should be added beyond those hypothesized (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). This step is
necessary to determine if the participants’ responses indicate any unexpected
relationships between the dependent variables and the other constructs included in model.
If these unexpected relationships are not accounted for, it can reduce the accuracy of the
hypothesis testing, leading to misinterpretation of the results. If the model fit is
significantly improved by the addition of a path, this indicates that the path should be
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added to properly specify the model. Based on the LM test, five additional main effect
paths were added: (1) Empathetic Concern (a first order factor in the ECI) predicting
Organizational Identification, (2) Moral Motivation (another first order ECI factor)
predicting Organizational Identification, (3) Moral Motivation predicting Individual
UPB, (4) Moral Motivation predicting Department UPB, and (5) MPQ predicting
Department UPB. The same five paths were necessary when not controlling for method
effects (Main Effects-Original), when controlling method effects with the unmeasured
latent method factor (Main Effects-Original-ULMF), and when controlling for method
effects using the IM marker variable (Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker). The additional
parameters significantly improved model fit (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(5) = 78.62, p < .001; Δ CFI
= .004, Δ RMSEA = .001).
Testing multiplicative effects.
Creating multiplicative latent variables.
To test the hypothesized interaction effects, latent interaction variables were
created (Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004). First, all measured items were mean centered. Then,
to create an interaction variable to test the interaction of two factors A and B, the most
reliable item from factor A is multiplied by the most reliable item from factor B. This is
repeated with the two second most reliable items and the two third most reliable items.
This creates three A*B items, which are then loaded onto a latent A*B factor. The A*B
factor is added to the model and is allowed to covary with the other exogenous variables,
and a structural path is added between the A*B factor and the appropriate dependent
variable.
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To test interactions where a second order factor C interacts with a first order
factor D, the process described above is repeated for each of the first order factors within
C. If C has six first order factors, this would create six first order interaction factors
(C1*D, C2*D, C3*D, C4*D, C5*D, and C6*D). Then, the six first order interaction
factors would load onto a single second order interaction factor.
To test the hypothesized quadratic effects, a similar process is used to create latent
quadratic variables. To create a quadratic variable to test the quadratic effect of factor A,
the most reliable A item is squared, as are the second- and third- most reliable items.
Then, these three squared items are loaded onto a latent quadratic factor A*A. For second
order factors, each of the first order factors are squared with themselves (A1*A1, A2*A2,
etc) and then loaded onto a single second order quadratic variable.
Individual multiplicative effects.
To test each of the 15 hypothesized interaction effects and the two hypothesized
quadratic effects, all necessary multiplicative factors were created and tested in separate
Individual Multiplicative Effects models by adding each one individually to Main EffectsRevised. See Table 11 for the unstandardized parameter estimate, SSE, and p value for
the hypothesized multiplicative effect in each Individual Multiplicative Effects model.
Hypothesized multiplicative effects with nonsignificant parameter estimates in the
Individual Multiplicative Effect models were considered not supported and were not
tested further. One hypothesized quadratic effect and three interactions had significant
parameter estimates: (1) H1a (ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB), (2) H4a-1
(ECI*Goals Pressure predicting Individual UPB), (3) H9a (MPQ*Organizational
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Identification predicting UPB), and (4) H9b-2 (MPQ*Goals Empowerment predicting
Individual UPB). These four multiplicative hypotheses were retained for further testing.
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Table 11: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates of Individual Multiplicative Effects.
Model Name
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-IM-Marker
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-ULMF
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-IM-Marker

Multiplicative Effect
ECI*ECI
ECI*ECI
ECI*ECI
ECI*ECI
ECI*ECI
ECI*ECI
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Empowerment
ECI*Goals Empowerment
ECI*Goals Empowerment
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Pressure
ECI*Goals Empowerment
ECI*Goals Empowerment
ECI*Goals Empowerment

Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
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Parameter Estimate (SE)
-.25*** (.08)
-.26** (.09)
-.24** (.08)
(.08)
.10
.09
(.08)
.10
(.08)
.23*** (.07)
.23*** (.07)
.20**
(.07)
.01
(.09)
-.01
(.09)
-.03
(.08)
.10
(.08)
.11
(.08)
.10
(.08)
.03
(.09)
.02
(.08)
(.09)
.03

Table 11 Continued.
Parameter Estimate (SE)

Model Name

Multiplicative Effect

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a

ECI*Relativism

.10

(.06)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-ULMF

ECI*Relativism

.10

(.06)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-IM-Marker

ECI*Relativism

.11

(.06)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1

Goals Pressure*Relativism

-.03

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-ULMF

Goals Pressure*Relativism

-.03

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-IM-Marker

Goals Pressure*Relativism

-.03

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2

Goals Empowerment*Relativism

.01

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-ULMF

Goals Empowerment*Relativism

.01

(.01)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-IM-Marker

Goals Empowerment*Relativism

.01

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c

Org. Ident*Relativism

.01

(.01)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-ULMF

Org. Ident*Relativism

.01

(.01)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-IM-Marker

Org. Ident*Relativism

.02

(.01)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a

ECI*Idealism

.09

(.08)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-ULMF

ECI*Idealism

.08

(.08)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-IM-Marker

ECI*Idealism

.12

(.08)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1

Goals Pressure*Idealism

-.01

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-ULMF

Goals Pressure*Idealism

-.01

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-IM-Marker

Goals Pressure*Idealism

.00

(.03)

Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
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Table 11 Continued.
Model Name

Multiplicative Effect

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2

Goals Empowerment*Idealism

-.02

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-ULMF

Goals Empowerment*Idealism

-.02

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-IM-Marker

Goals Empowerment*Idealism

-.01

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c

Org. Ident*Idealism

-.02

(.02)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-ULMF

Org. Ident*Idealism

-.02

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-IM-Marker

Org. Ident*Idealism

-.01

(.03)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a

Org. Ident*Moral Potency

-.26*** (.07)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-ULMF

Org. Ident*Moral Potency

-.26**

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-IM-Marker

Org. Ident*Moral Potency

-.25*** (.07)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1

Goals Pressure*Moral Potency

.00

(.07)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-ULMF

Goals Pressure*Moral Potency

.00

(.08)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-IM-Marker

Goals Pressure*Moral Potency

.00

(.07)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2

Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency

-.20**

(.07)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-ULMF

Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency

-.19*

(.08)

Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-IM-Marker

Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency

-.19*

(.07)

Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
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Parameter Estimate (SE)

(.08)

Cumulative multiplicative effects.
The four hypothesized multiplicative effects that were supported individually
were tested together in order to determine which would still be supported after removing
explained variance shared with each other. However, testing four multiplicative effects
together led to complications due to the large number of multiplicative terms added to the
model. To test the three significant interactions and the significant quadratic effect
together required the addition of 48 multiplicative items, loading onto 16 first order latent
variables and two second order latent variables. This was problematic because each item
added to the model results in a slight reduction in model fit, and multiplicative items in
particular increase multivariate kurtosis, or non-normality (Cortina, Chen, & Dunlap,
2001). Without adequate model fit and acceptable multivariate normality, the results of
hypothesis testing cannot be trusted to be accurate (Bollen, 1989). Although the model
maintained adequate fit when each multiplicative effect was tested separately, and the use
of the Satorra-Bentler method helped to correct for the multivariate kurtosis, including all
four significant multiplicative effects caused the model to have poor fit (S-B χ2(7387) =
14408.08, p < .001, CFI = .83, RMSEA = .05) and very high multivariate kurtosis
(normalized estimate = 143.81). The multiplicative effects involving the ECI were the
most problematic, as each one required the addition of 18 product terms (three for each
factor). For this reason, the composite approach to latent variable interactions was used
for multiplicative effects involving the ECI (Cortina et al., 2001).
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Creating composite multiplicative terms.
In order to reduce the number of multiplicative terms added to the model while
still testing all significant effects simultaneously, composite terms were used to test the
multiplicative effects involving the ECI: H1a (ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB) and
H4a-1 (ECI*Goals Pressure predicting Individual UPB; Cortina et al., 2001). Composites
of the mean centered factors were created for each first order ECI factor and for Goals
Pressure. Items contributing to each composite term were weighted according to their
reliability to improve the reliability of the resulting composite terms. To test H1a, the
composite versions of each ECI factor were squared and then loaded onto a single latent
quadratic factor. To test H4a-1, the composite version of Goals Pressure was multiplied
with each of the composite ECI factors and then loaded onto a single latent interaction
factor. Thus, the model Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-Composite tested all significant
effects simultaneously while also the reducing the total number of multiplicative items
from 48 to 24. This reduction in multiplicative items significantly improved the model fit
(Scaled Δ S-B χ2 (2643) = 6093.75, p < .001, Δ CFI = .06, Δ RMSEA = .02) and reduced
the normalized estimate of multivariate kurtosis from 143.81 to 119.40.
Final Model.
One of the four significant multiplicative effects (H9b-2: MPQ*Goals
Empowerment predicting Individual UPB) became nonsignificant when tested in
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects and Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-Composite; this
effect was dropped from the Final Model to improve model parsimony and statistical
power. Thus, the Final Model included all of the hypothesized main effects (significant
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and non-significant), five additional main effects, and the three significant hypothesized
multiplicative effects (H1a: ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB, H4a-1: ECI*Goals
Pressure predicting Individual UPB, and H9a: MPQ*Organizational Identification
predicting UPB). The Final Model demonstrated adequate fit (S-B χ2(4183) = 5577.89, p
< .001; CFI = .93, RMSEA = .03). See Table 12 for unstandardized parameter estimates,
SSE, and p values for the Final Model. See Figure 3.1 for the Final Model with
standardized parameter estimates included, Figure 3.2 for Final Model-ULMF with
standardized parameter estimates, and Figure 3.3 for Final Model-IM-Marker with
standardized parameter estimates.
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Table 12: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model with and without Method Controls.

Predicting Org Ident

Final Model

Final Model-ULMF

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

ECI

2.02*** (.32)

ECI-Empathic Concern

-.30*

(.12)

-.29**

(.11)

-.34**

(.13)

ECI-Moral Motivation

-.23**

(.08)

-.30*

(.13)

-.34**

(.13)

R

2

Predicting Individual UPB

2.08*** (.36)

Final Model-IM-Marker

2.20*** (.36)

.44

.42

.45

Final Model

Final Model-ULMF

Final Model-IM-Marker

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

ECI

.14

Organizational Identification

.30*** (.04)

.31*** (.04)

.29*** (.04)

Goals Pressure

.00

(.08)

-.01

(.08)

-.01

(.08)

Goals Empowerment

.10

(.09)

.10

(.08)

.11

(.09)

Dept. UPB

.14*

(.06)

.14*

(.06)

.14*

(.06)

Idealism

-.12*

(.05)

-.11*

(.05)

-.09

(.05)

Relativism

.01

(.03)

.01

(.03)

.01

(.03)

MPQ

-.70*** (.14)

-.67*** (.14)

-.41*** (.13)

Fear Tolerance

.05

.05

(.07)

.05

(.07)

ECI-Moral Motivation

-.19*** (.06)

-.30**

(.08)

-.20**

(.07)

ECI*ECI (H1a)

-.19*

(.08)

-.20*

(.08)

-.20*

(.08)

ECI*Goals Pressure (H4a-1)

.26***

(.07)

.24*** (.07)

Org. Ident*MPQ (H9a)

-.22**

(.08)

-.22**

R

2

Predicting Department UPB

(.14)

.18

(.07)

(.16)

(.08)

.12

(.14)

.22*** (.07)
(.08)

-.20**

.58

.56

.46

Final Model

Final Model-ULMF

Final Model-IM-Marker

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

Estimate (SE)

ECI

.04

(.16)

.01

(.19)

.02

(.17)

Goals Pressure

.03

(.09)

.00

(.08)

.03

(.09)

Goals Empowerment

.01

(.10)

.03

(.10)

.03

(.10)

ECI-Moral Character

-.49*** (.06)

-.49*** (.09)

-.50*** (.09)

Moral Potency

-.31*** (.09)

-.30*** (.09)

-.22**

R

2

.54

.51

(.08)
.50

Note: Values in Final Model column do not control for method effects; values in Final Model-ULMF
column control for common method variance; values in Final Model-IM-Marker column control for
common method bias. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Figure 3.1: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model.

Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects.
Values are from the model not controlling for method effects. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*
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Figure 3.2: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model-ULMF.

Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects.
Values are from the model controlling for method effects with the ULMF. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Figure 3.3: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model-IM-Marker.

Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects.
Values are from the model controlling for method effects with the IM marker variable. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Hypothesis Results
The main effect hypotheses were considered supported if they demonstrated
statistically significant parameter estimates in the Final Model. Multiplicative hypotheses
were considered supported if they had statistically significant parameter estimates in the
Individual Multiplicative Effects models and remained significant when tested
cumulatively in the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model and the Final Model. The
conclusions reached for all hypotheses were the same when controlling for method
effects using the unmeasured latent method factor, controlling for method effects with the
IM marker variable, and when not controlling for method effects, except for H5b. Except
where explicitly stated, the results reported in this section are from the models controlling
for method effects using the unmeasured latent method factor (Final Model-ULMF,
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-ULMF, and Individual Multiplicative Effects-ULMF).
H1a.
A significant negative curvilinear effect was found between the second order ECI
factor and Individual UPB, supporting H1a 5 (quadratic term: B = -.20, SE = .08, p < .05;
linear term: B = .18, SE = .16, ns). However, the shape of the relationship was slightly
different than hypothesized. I predicted that as ethical climate increased from low to
moderate levels there would be no effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB,
and that as ethical climate increased from moderate to high levels there would be a
5

Due to practical statistical constraints, the significance of the simple slopes for the curvilinear effect of
H1a was not tested, despite being predicted in the hypothesis. It is not common practice to empirically test
the simple slopes of quadratic effects, and the statistical outputs given by structural equation modeling
programs do not include the necessary coefficient covariance values to calculate the significance of simple
slopes for multiplicative effects. Instead, the presence of a significant negative quadratic effect and shape of
the curvilinear effect at low, moderate, and high ethical climate was used as evidence of support for the
hypothesis.

111

decrease in individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Instead, the results indicated an
inverse U-shaped relationship where increasing ethical climate from low to moderate
levels sharply increased individuals’ willingness towards UPB and increasing ethical
climate from moderate to high levels slightly decreased individuals’ willingness towards
UPB. Counterintuitively, individuals’ willingness towards UPB was higher on average
for those who reported high ECI scores compared to those who reported low ECI scores.
See Figure 4.1 for a graph of the curvilinear relationship found in between ethical climate
and individuals’ willingness towards UPB.
Figure 4.1: Curvilinear Relationship between Ethical Climate and Individuals’ UPB.
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The results of hypothesis H1a were affected by the addition of a direct path
between Moral Motivation (an ECI first order factor) and Individual UPB (B = -.30, SE =
.08, p < .01). This path was added during the Main Effects-Revised stage, based on the
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results of the LM test. Moral Motivation is highly correlated with the full ECI scale, as
evidenced by its factor loading (λ = .85). The Moral Motivation subscale has a stronger
negative correlation with the Individual UPB factor (r = -.30) than does the full ECI scale
(r = -.21). This correlation pattern resulted in inconsistent mediation, which strengthened
Moral Motivation’s negative effect and reversed the ECI’s linear effect on Individual
UPB from negative to positive (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2010). The results of
models Main Effects-Original and Main Effects-Revised support this claim: in Main
Effects-Original, the ECI’s parameter estimate predicting Individual UPB was negative
(B = -.15, SE = .14, ns). After the addition of Moral Motivation as a predictor of
Individual UPB in Main Effects-Revised, the ECI’s parameter estimate predicting
Individual UPB was positive (B = .19, SE = .16, ns).
The effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB was
recalculated, this time including the indirect effect of the second order ECI through Moral
Motivation along with the direct linear and quadratic effects of the second order ECI
predicting Individual UPB. The resulting curvilinear relationship was closer to that
predicted. See Figure 4.2. The overall shape is still an inverted U, but the revised results
indicate that individuals’ willingness towards UPB is higher on average for those who
reported low ethical climate compared to those who reported high ethical climate.
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Figure 4.2: Curvilinear relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB,
Revised.
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Note: Accounts for the direct path between Moral Motivation and Individual UPB.
H1b.
H1b was not supported; no significant curvilinear relationship was found between
ethical climate and department-wide UPB (quadratic term: B = .09, SE = .08, ns; linear
term: B = .07, SE = .19, ns).
The relationship between ethical climate and departmental UPB was affected by
the addition of a direct path between Moral Motivation (an ECI first order factor) and
Department UPB (B = -.49, SE = .09, p < .001). This additional path lead to a significant
negative indirect effect from ethical climate to departmental UPB through Moral
Motivation (B = -.84, SE = .15, p < .001). As ECI scores increased by one point, reported
Departmental UPB decreased by .84 points through the mediating effect of Moral
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Motivation. The addition of this indirect effect removed explained variation previously
attributed to the second order ECI factor predicting departmental UPB: prior to the
addition of the direct path from Moral Motivation to Department UPB (in model Main
Effects-Original), there was a significant negative effect between the second order ECI
factor and Department UPB (B = -.90, SE = .12, p < .001). After Moral Motivation was
added as a predictor of Department UPB (in Main Effects-Revised), there was no longer a
significant direct effect between the second order ECI and Department UPB (B = .05, SE
= .19, ns).
The addition of the direct path between Moral Motivation and Department UPB
explains the lack of a direct linear effect between the second order ECI and Department
UPB, but it does not explain the lack of the hypothesized curvilinear effect. In the interest
of thoroughness, a quadratic effect was also tested for Moral Motivation predicting
departmental UPB, but this produced no effect (B = .00, SE = .02, ns). H1b is therefore
considered not supported.
H2a.
A significant positive relationship was found between ethical climate and
organizational identification, supporting H2a (B = 2.08, SE = .36, p < .001). As
individuals’ second order ECI scores increased by one point, individuals’ organizational
identification scores increased by two points.
This effect was strengthened by the addition of direct paths from two of the ECI’s
first order factors predicting organizational identification: Empathic Concern (B = -.29,
SE = .11, p < .01) and Moral Motivation (B = -.30, SE = .13 p < .05). Empathic Concern
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and Moral Motivation are highly correlated with the second order ECI, as evidenced by
their factor loadings (λ = .88, λ = .85). The second order ECI has a stronger positive
correlation with organizational identification (r = .58) than does Empathic Concern (r =
.47) or Moral Motivation (r = .36). This correlation pattern resulted in inconsistent
mediation, which strengthened the positive effect of the second order ECI on
organizational identification and reversed the effects of Empathic Concern and Moral
Motivation predicting organizational identification from positive to negative (MacKinnon
et al., 2010).
Even without this statistical anomaly, ethical climate demonstrated a strong
positive effect on organizational identification. In the Main Effects-Original model
(before Empathic Concern and Moral Motivation were added as predictors of
organizational identification), there was a significant positive relationship between the
second order ECI and organizational identification (B = 1.08, SE = .08, p < .001). Also, in
the Final Model, the effect of ethical climate on organizational identification was
recalculated after controlling for the inconsistent mediation of the ECI through Empathic
Concern and Moral Motivation. The total effect of ethical climate on organizational
identification is .59. As second order ECI scores increased by 1 point, the total causal
effect on organizational identification scores was an increase of .59 points.
H2b.
H2b was supported: there was a significant positive relationship between
organizational identification and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = .31, SE
= .04, p < .001).
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H3a-1, H3a-2, H3b-1, and H3b-2.
H3a-1, H3a-2, H3b-1, and H3b-2 were all not supported. There was no significant
relationship between pressuring goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB
(B = -.01, SE = .08, ns), empowering goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards
UPB (B = .10, SE = .08, ns), pressuring goals climate and department-wide UPB (B = .00,
SE = .08, ns), or empowering goals climate and department-wide UPB (B = .03, SE = .10,
ns).
H4a-1.
H4a-1 was supported: there was a significant positive interaction between ethical
climate and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B
= .23, SE = .07, p < .001). As ECI scores increased by 1 point, the slope of pressuring
goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB increased by .23 points.
The slope of pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB
was negative when ethical climate was low, there was no relationship between pressuring
goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB when ethical climate was
average, and the slope of pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness
towards UPB was positive when ethical climate was high. See Figure 5 for a graph of the
interaction between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’
UPB.
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Figure 5: Interaction between Ethical Climate and Pressuring Goals Climate predicting
Individuals’ UPB.

Although the interaction effect of ethical climate and pressuring goals climate on
individuals’ willingness towards UPB was as predicted, the simple slopes of pressuring
goals climate at average and low ethical climate were unexpected. Although it was not
explicitly stated in hypothesis H4a, it was expected that the simple slope of goals climate
at low ethical climate would be flat or slightly positive as opposed to negative and the
simple slope of goals climate at average ethical climate would be positive instead of flat.
This would have been the result of the interaction between ethical climate and pressuring
goals climate if there had been a significant positive main effect of pressuring goals
climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB, as H3a-1 predicted. However,
pressuring goals climate was not found to have a significant main effect on individuals’
willingness to engage in UPB (B = -.01, SE = .08, ns). The lack of a main effect between
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pressuring goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB caused the simple
slopes of the interaction to slant in opposite directions rather than to all branch upwards.
H4a-2.
There was no significant interaction between ethical climate and empowering
goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = -.01, SE = .09, ns).
H4b-1 and H4b-2.
H4b-1 and H4b-2 were not supported. There was no significant interaction
between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting department-wide UPB (B
= .11, SE = .08, ns) or ethical climate and empowering goals climate predicting
department-wide UPB (B = .02, SE = .08, ns).
H5a and H5b.
H5a was not supported: no significant relationship was found between relativism
and individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = .01, SE = .03, ns). H5b was mostly
supported: a significant negative relationship was found between idealism and
individuals’ willingness towards UPB in the Final Model (B = -.12, SE = .05, p < .05)
and when controlling for method effects in Final Model-ULMF (B = -.11, SE = .05, p <
.05), but not when controlling for method effects in Final Model-IM-Marker (B = -.09,
SE = .05, p = .07).
H6a, H6b-1, H6b-2, and H6c.
H6a, H6b-1, H6b-2, and H6c were all not supported. There was no significant
interaction between relativism and ethical climate (B = .10, SE = .06, ns), relativism and
pressuring goals climate (B = -.03, SE = .02, ns), relativism and empowering goals
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climate (B = .01, SE = .01, ns) or relativism and organizational identification (B = .01, SE
= .01, ns) predicting individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB.
H7a, H7b-1, H7b-2, and H7c.
H7a, H7b-1, H7b-2, and H7c were all not supported. There was no significant
interaction between idealism and ethical climate (B = .08, SE = .08, ns), idealism and
pressuring goals climate (B = -.01, SE = .03, ns), idealism and empowering goals climate
(B = -.02, SE = .03, ns) or idealism and organizational identification (B = -.02, SE = .03,
ns) predicting individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB.
H8.
H8 was supported: a significant negative relationship was found between moral
potency and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = -.67, SE = .14, p < .001). As
participants’ MPQ scores increased by one point, participants’ Individual UPB scores
decreased by .67 points.
H9a.
There was a significant negative interaction between moral potency and
organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB, supporting
H9a (B = -.22, SE = .08, p < .01). As individuals’ MPQ scores increased by 1 point, the
slope of organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB
decreased by .22 points. The slope of organizational identification predicting individuals’
willingness towards UPB was slightly positive for participants with high moral potency,
moderately positive for those with average moral potency, and highly positive for those
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with low moral potency. See Figure 6 for the interaction between moral potency and
organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB.
Figure 6: Interaction between Organizational Identification and Moral Potency
predicting Individuals’ UPB.

H9b-1 and H9b-2.
H9b-1 was not supported. There was no significant interaction between moral
potency and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB (B = .00, SE = .08, ns).
H9b-2 was initially supported, but was not supported in the cumulative model. There was
a significant negative interaction between empowering goals climate and moral potency
predicting individuals’ UPB when tested in the Individual Multiplicative Effects model (B
= -.19, SE = .08, p < .05), but this relationship was nonsignificant when tested along with
the other significant interactions in the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model (B = -.04,
SE = .08, ns).
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Unhypothesized Main Effects
Six unhypothesized main effects were found to be significant. Although not
attached to a specific hypothesis, a path between Department UPB and Individual UPB
was included in the proposed model. Departmental UPB was found to have a significant
positive effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = .14, SE = .06, p < .05).
Five additional main effect paths were added post hoc, based on unexpected variable
relationships indicated by the LM test. Moral potency was found to have a strong
negative relationship with departmental UPB (B = -.30, SE = .09, p < .001). The
remaining four unexpected main effects involved first order factors from the ECI: (1)
Moral Motivation predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = -.30, SE = .08, p
< .01), (2) Moral Motivation predicting departmental UPB (B = -.49, SE = .09, p < .001),
(3) Empathic Concern predicting organizational identification (B = -.29, SE = .11, p <
.01), and (4) Moral Motivation predicting organizational identification (B = -.30, SE =
.13, p < .05).
As explained in subsection H2a, although Empathic Concern (r = .47) and Moral
Motivation (r = .36) both had positive correlations with organizational identification, the
second order ECI factor had a stronger positive correlation with organizational
identification (r = .58). Because subscales Empathic Concern (λ = .88) and Moral
Motivation (λ = .85) are both highly correlated with the second order ECI, the relative
weakness of the subscales’ correlation with organizational identification caused their
parameter estimates to be negative instead of positive, resulting in inconsistent mediation
(MacKinnon et al., 2007).
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Deconstructing the Effect of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB
The Final Model includes numerous paths that estimate the effect of ethical
climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB, including direct causal 6 effects,
indirect causal effects, non-causal effects, and a moderating effect. Using the Sobel
(1982) test for mediation, 5 of the indirect causal effects were found to be significant: (1)
the 2-path effect through Moral Motivation (ß = -.31, SE = .14, p < .001), (2) the 2-path
effect through Organizational Identification (ß = .48, SE = .14, p < .001), (3) the 3-path
effect through Empathic Concern and Organizational Identification (ß = -.12, SE = .06, p
< .05), (4) the 3-path effect through Moral Motivation and Organizational Identification
(ß = -.12, SE = .07, p < .05), and (5) the 3-path effect through Moral Motivation and
Department UPB (ß = -.09, SE = .05, p < .05).
The three standardized indirect effects through organizational identification total
to .24; as ECI scores increased by 1 SD, Individual UPB scores increased by .24 SDs due
to ethical climate’s effect on organizational identification. Considering all causal paths,
the total standardized linear effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards
UPB is -.03, with a standardized quadratic effect of -.15. See Figure 7.1 for a graph of the
total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB.

6

In structural equation modeling, “causal” effects involve regression paths connecting dependent variables
to their predictor variables and “non-causal” effects involve to model-specified correlations between
variables. Causal effects are not meant to imply true causality of one variable on another.
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Figure 7.1: Total Causal Effect of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB.
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Note: Includes all significant direct and indirect causal paths.
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There is also one significant non-causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’
willingness towards UPB, through ethical climate’s correlation with moral potency (ß =
.22, SE = .07, p < .001). Adding this non-causal effect to the total causal effect, the total
association between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB is a
standardized linear effect of -.25, with a standardized quadratic term of -.15. See Figure
7.2 for a graph of the total association between ethical climate and individuals’
willingness towards UPB.
Figure 7.2: Total Association between Ethical Climate and Individuals’ UPB.
3
2.8
2.6

Individual UPB

2.4
2.2
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Ethical Climate
(Standard deviations from mean)

Note: Includes all significant causal and non-causal paths.
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To visualize all of the effects of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness
towards UPB, the interaction between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate was
graphed along with ethical climate’s total association with individuals’ willingness
towards UPB. See Figure 8.
Figure 8: All Significant Model-Implied Effects of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB.
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126

CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION

This study’s findings support many of the theoretical perspectives on UPB and
organizational climate. The design of this study was able to deconstruct the multifaceted
relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The
results advance UPB and organizational climate theory by demonstrating the effect of
multiple climates interacting to predict intentions towards UPB, a strategy never
previously attempted in UPB research. This study was also the first to identify moral
potency as a powerful influencing factor on UPB. I will first discuss the major findings of
the present study and offer theoretical explanations for unexpected results. Then, I will
recount the limitations of this study, and propose strategies to address these problems in
future research. Finally, I will overview the practical conclusions of this study’s findings.
Major Findings
Ethical climate and UPB.
As predicted, ethical climate was found to have a complex relationship with UPB,
exerting both positive and negative influences through a combination of direct, indirect,
non-causal, and moderating effects. Ethical climate increases individuals’ willingness to
engage in UPB by (1) increasing employees’ organizational identification and by (2)
interacting with pressuring goals climate to increase tendencies towards UPB. In contrast,
ethical climate discourages UPB by (1) exerting a negative linear and quadratic effect on
individuals’ willingness towards UPB, (2) exerting a negative linear effect on
department-wide UPB, and (3) through the association between ethical climate and
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employees’ moral potency. The results indicate that moral motivation is the most
important dimension within ethical climate for reducing UPB. Ethical climate definitively
demonstrated a strong negative effect on department-wide UPB, but ethical climate’s
relationship with individuals’ willingness towards UPB was more complicated. Although
higher ethical climates were generally associated with lower individual willingness
towards UPB, the results suggest that this effect may only be appreciable for highly
ethical climates. Even for highly ethical climates, the reduction in willingness towards
UPB was neutralized when pressuring goals climate was high.
Positive effects of ethical climate on UPB.
Organizational identification’s mediating effect.
Employees who perceived their workplace to have a strong ethical climate tended
to have higher organizational identification, which in turn increased their willingness to
engage in UPB. This supports the argument that employees in workplaces with highly
ethical climates tend to notice and appreciate the supportive environment provided by
their employer, leading to higher organizational identification (Treviño et al., 1998;
Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). Employees with high organizational identification
internalize the organization’s values and goals as their own, leading to a stronger desire
to achieve organizational objectives (Avey et al., 2009; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008).
Employees with high organizational identification may therefore be tempted to “help”
their organization succeed through engaging in UPB.
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Pressuring goals climate’s interaction effect.
Ethical climate was also found to positively moderate the effect of pressuring
goals climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB. This supports the proposition that
ethical climate operates as a foundational climate, an argument that incorporates
organizational climate theory and the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Schneider et
al., 2011). When ethical climate is high, employees feel well supported and are therefore
more willing to put forth effort on behalf of the organization (Demirtas & Akdogan,
2014). Employees allocate this extra effort based on their perceptions of the
organization’s strategic priorities; this in turn strengthens the effectiveness of various
strategic climates to produce relevant outcomes (Schneider et al., 2011).
Both of the positive influences of ethical climate on UPB appear to operate
through increasing employees’ perceptions of organizational support, which in turn
increases employees’ organizational concern (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Although
organizational concern, or employees’ desire to achieve organizational objectives, is
understandably considered a positive attribute, these results provide an example of the
potential unintended consequences of under-regulated employees with high
organizational concern.
Negative effects of ethical climate on UPB.
Moral motivation’s effect.
The results of this study indicate that certain dimensions of ethical climate have a
stronger negative effect on UPB than others. Moral motivation had a much stronger
negative linear effect on individuals’ intentions towards UPB and department-wide UPB
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than did the other ethical climate dimensions. Indeed, after adding the Moral Motivation
factor as a predictor of Individual UPB and Department UPB, the linear effects of the
second order ECI factor on both UPB variables was no longer significant.
Examining the definition of the Moral Motivation factor and the items it contains,
it is easy to explain why this ethical climate dimension would have the strongest negative
effect on UPB. Moral motivation represents the relative value placed on ethical
considerations when making decisions at work. Items include Around here, power is
more important than honesty and In order to control scares resources, people in my
department are willing to compromise their ethical values somewhat. This central theme
of weighing ethical considerations against other priorities perfectly illustrates the conflict
between ethical sensitivity and organizational concern that theoretically predicts UPB. In
fact, one could argue that the moral motivation dimension of ethical climate is the
collective, group-level form of the ethical sensitivity construct (i.e., the extent that an
individual emphasizes ethical considerations when making decisions; Pierce & Aguinis,
2015). A high score on Moral Motivation would indicate that ethical values are
prioritized above all other considerations when making workplace decisions; this would
virtually rule out the possibility of UPB, as long as all employees complied with
departmental norms. Based on these considerations, it seems logical that moral
motivation would have a strong negative effect on both department-wide UPB and
individuals’ intentions towards UPB.
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Ethical climate’s curvilinear effect.
Although the moral motivation dimension was responsible for the significant
negative linear effect of ethical climate on both department-wide UPB and individuals’
willingness to engage in UPB, the second order ethical climate factor contributed the
significant negative quadratic effect on individuals’ intentions towards UPB. When the
linear and quadratic terms were considered together, the curvilinear direct effect of
ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB was close to my prediction:
increasing a department’s ethical climate from low to moderate levels produced slight
increases in individuals’ tendencies towards UPB, but increasing ethical climate from
moderate to high levels was associated with sharp decreases in individuals’ willingness to
engage in UPB. While a downward-sloping curvilinear relationship was predicted, I
expected that increasing ethical climate from low to moderate levels would result in no
change in individuals’ willingness towards UPB rather than a slight increase in
individuals’ UPB.
Perhaps the shape of the curvilinear effect between ethical climate and
individuals’ willingness towards UPB was slightly different than predicted due to the
existence of an additional positive indirect effect between ethical climate and individuals’
UPB for which this study did not control. Past research has proposed that strong ethical
climates increase employees’ organizational concern, which explains the positive
influence of ethical climate on UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). The present study used
organizational identification as a proxy for organizational concern because there are
currently no scales available that directly measure organizational concern. It is possible
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that the Organizational Identification scale did not fully capture all aspects of
participants’ organizational concern, leading to an underestimation of the positive
indirect effect of ethical climate on UPB. If any portion of the indirect positive effect
between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB was left unmeasured, this would become
confounded with the direct effect between ethical climate and UPB and cause the modelimplied curvilinear effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB to be less negative than
expected.
Despite the slight deviation from the hypothesized curve, the results still support
the prediction that highly ethical climates are associated with exponentially lower
individual willingness towards UPB than all other levels of ethical climate. Past research
on ethical leadership offers a theoretical explanation for this effect: Miao and colleagues
(2013) argued that moderately ethical leaders are ineffective in reducing UPB because
they send the message that behaving ethically is important, but perhaps not as important
as achieving other organizational goals. In contrast, highly ethical leaders send the
message that behaving ethically is a top priority; this clear and consistent message is
therefore more effective in influencing employee behavior away from UPB. Likewise,
employees develop ethical climate perceptions based on many environmental cues,
including workplace ethics policies, how those policies are enacted, and observations of
which employee behaviors are rewarded or punished (Schneider et al., 2013). Employees
determine how they should behave in ethical dilemmas by discerning the message created
by this combination of environmental cues. Perhaps departments with highly ethical
climates are able to achieve consistent alignment of all workplace ethical cues, making
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the behavioral expectations conveyed by a highly ethical climate much easier to interpret
than those conveyed by a moderate or low ethical climate. This could explain why highly
ethical climates appear to be distinctly effective at reducing employees’ willingness to
engage in UPB.
Non-causal effect through moral potency.
Finally, higher ethical climate is associated with lower UPB due in part to the
positive correlation between ethical climate and individuals’ moral potency. Employees
in departments with higher ethical climates were found to have higher levels of moral
potency on average, which in turn decreased departmental UPB and individuals’
willingness towards UPB.
The significant correlation between ethical climate and moral potency was
unexpected, as the construct of moral potency is defined as a stable individual trait. It
could be that over time, working in an environment with a highly ethical climate
strengthens one’s moral potency. Moral potency represents one’s personal capacity to
complete the final two steps of the EDM (ethical decision making) process: committing
to take the most ethical option and then following through with ethical action (Rest,
1986). Past research has indicated that ethical climate influences the process through
which employees make ethical decisions in the workplace: ethical climate has been found
to increase employee moral intensity (DeConick, 2003), and improve ethical judgements
(Bartels et al., 1998; DeConick, 2003), ethical intentions (Buchan, 2005), and moral
decision making (Verbeke et al., 1996). This has led some researchers to equate ethical
climate to a workplace’s normative collective capacity to complete all four steps in the
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EDM process (Arnaud, 2010). Perhaps through improving the collective capacity of all
employees to complete the EDM process, ethical climates provide the ideal environment
in which employees can practice and eventually internalize successful ethical decision
making, increasing their individual moral potency.
Alternatively, it could be that employees with high moral potency influence other
employees through demonstrating their strong commitment to ethical values. Perhaps
highly morally potent employees act as powerfull role models of proper ethical behavior,
affecting the overall ethical climate of the workplace. Although it is unclear of the exact
nature of the relationship, the results of this study indicate that there is a positive
connection between departmental ethical climate and individuals’ moral potency.
These results demonstrate the powerful effect that ethical climate can have to
reduce UPB in the workplace. Among the six ethical climate dimensions, moral
motivation demonstrated the strongest negative effect on both departmental UPB and
individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Based on the similarities between the
departmental moral motivation and individual ethical sensitivity, it is logical to argue that
ethical workplace climates decrease UPB primarily though increasing employees’ ethical
sensitivity. Due to the quadratic effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness
towards UPB, highly ethical climates were exponentially more effective at decreasing
individuals’ willingness towards UPB than other levels of ethical climate. Perhaps this is
because highly ethical climates are able to send a consistent, easy to interpret message
concerning the importance of behaving ethically at work. Also, it may be that ethical
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climates increase individuals’ moral potency, another variable that was found to reduce
UPB.
Total effect of ethical climate on UPB.
Total effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB.
This study predicted that the total effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB
would be the same as the total effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness
towards UPB: an inverse U-shaped relationship. It was assumed that ethical climate
would have the same relationships with organizational concern and ethical sensitivity at
the group level as it does at the individual level, leading to a similar total effect. It was
also predicted that the effect of the interaction between ethical climate and goals climate
would operate in a similar fashion at both the individual and department level. However,
none of the hypotheses predicting the specific effects of ethical climate on departmental
UPB were supported. No curvilinear effect was found between ethical climate and
departmental UPB, and no interactions were found between ethical climate and goals
climate predicting departmental UPB. Although there was a significant negative linear
relationship between the second order ethical climate factor and departmental UPB in
earlier models, this effect was virtually eliminated by the addition of the moral
motivation dimension as a predictor of departmental UPB. In the final model, the only
significant relationship found between ethical climate and departmental UPB was the
sizable negative effect exerted by moral motivation.
It is difficult to produce a theoretical argument that explains why there was no
quadratic effect of ethical climate predicting departmental UPB or any interaction
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between ethical climate and goals climate predicting departmental UPB, when these
effects were found to predict individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The reason could
have to do with the study design, which was entirely self-report and only sampled one
individual per department. The design did not allow for aggregation of the climate
measures or departmental UPB, which would have led to a more accurate representation
of departmental climate and department-wide UPB. One employee’s perceptions of
departmental climate and UPB may differ from that of coworkers within the same
department; without a sample of multiple employees per department, there is no way to
verify the accuracy of a single employee’s perceptions. Research has shown that although
individual perceptions of department-level climate predict individual behavior well, these
individual perceptions are less accurate when predicting department-level behavior
(Ostroff, 1993; Schulte et al., 2006; Schulte et al., 2009). A single employee’s
perceptions of department-wide incidents of UPB may be especially prone to inaccuracy,
as coworkers could be motivated to hide their unethical behavior from other employees to
avoid detection. Still, despite these methodological challenges, the findings indicate that
ethical climate is a powerful deterrent on departmental UPB.
Total effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB.
The total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB
was a nearly symmetrical inverse U, with low and high ethical climate leading to
relatively low willingness towards UPB and moderate ethical climate leading to higher
willingness towards UPB. This mirrors the Miao and colleague’s (2013) finding of the
curvilinear relationship between ethical leadership and individuals’ willingness towards
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UPB. The present study extends prior research by identifying and characterizing the
many individual effects that combine to create the total inverse U-shaped relationship
between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB.
Ethical climate was also found to produce a non-causal effect on individuals’
UPB through ethical climate’s positive correlation with individuals’ moral potency.
When the total association between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB is taken into
account, low and moderate levels of ethical climate resulted in relatively high willingness
towards UPB and high levels of ethical climate resulted in much lower willingness
towards UPB. Finally, when the interaction with pressuring goals climate is added to the
total association between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB, the results indicate that
the beneficial effect of highly ethical climates to reduce individuals’ willingness towards
UPB is neutralized when pressuring goals climate is high.
The multitude of conflicting effects between ethical climate and individuals’
willingness towards UPB help to explain the inconsistent findings of past research.
Although one past study found no significant relationship between ethical climate and
individuals’ intentions towards UPB (Miao et al., 2013) and another found a positive
relationship (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015), only one of these studies tested for mediating
effects and neither tested ethical climate for quadratic effects 7 or interactions with other
climates. The design of this study allowed for a deconstruction the multifaceted
relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB by (1)
including variables related to the theoretical mechanisms behind willingness towards
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Miao and colleagues (2013) did test ethical leadership for quadratic effects, but not ethical climate.
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UPB, (2) simulating the interconnected nature of the relationships with structural
equation modeling, and (3) testing for multiplicative effects.
Moral potency and UPB.
Moral potency stood out as another powerful influence for reducing UPB. Moral
potency decreased UPB by (1) demonstrated the single strongest effect on individuals’
willingness to engage in UPB, (2) unexpectedly demonstrating a significant negative
effect on department-level UPB, and (3) interacting with organizational identification to
reduce the positive effect of organizational identification on individuals’ UPB.
Moral potency’s effect on individuals’ UPB.
Although moral potency was hypothesized to reduce individuals’ UPB, it was
somewhat unexpected to find that it had the single largest direct effect and the largest
total effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. The theoretical connection
between moral potency and willingness to engage in UPB could not be clearer. Moral
potency is thought to represent one’s personal capacity to complete the final two steps of
the EDM process: to choose the ethical option when faced with a dilemma, and then to
follow through on the decision with one’s actions (Rest, 1986). Based on this theory,
individuals’ moral potency will not only relate directly to individuals’ intentions towards
UPB, but also individuals’ true level of UPB engagement in the workplace.
These results suggest that along with the workplace environment, employees’
individual differences play a large role in shaping individuals’ willingness to engage in
UPB. The moral ownership and courage dimension may play a particularly crucial role in
preventing UPB in workplaces that lack the safeguard of a highly ethical climate. Moral
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ownership and courage represents one’s sense of responsibility to make ethical choices
and one’s commitment to moral values despite any opposing pressures (Hannah &
Avolio, 2010). Theoretically, individuals with strong moral ownership and courage
would be compelled to behave ethically in any setting, even in environments that might
otherwise promote UPB.
Moral potency’s effect on departmental UPB.
Moral potency was also found to have a significant negative effect on departmentwide UPB. This was unpredicted, as it was unexpected that an internal individual trait
held by a single employee would have a noticeable effect on the overall UPB within the
department.
It is possible that this effect was due to the fact that individuals’ moral potency
decreased individual willingness towards UPB, and that the amount of UPB committed
by the individual would affect the average amount of UPB in that individual’s
department. This is a conceivable explanation, but would only produce a significant
effect if the average number of employees within participants’ departments was relatively
low. Unfortunately, participants were not asked to report the size of their department, so
this premise cannot be tested.
Perhaps a more plausible explanation for the effect of individuals’ moral potency
on department-wide UPB is that coworkers avoid engaging in UPB around employees
who have high moral potency. Past research has found that those higher in moral potency
are more likely to report others for engaging in unethical actions (Schaubroeck et al.,
2010) and to confront coworkers who behaved unethically (Hannah et al., 2011). Perhaps
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employees who act on their moral values in these ways develop a reputation for being
intolerant of unethical behavior, which would lead coworkers to avoid engaging in any
UPB around those employees. In this way, participants high in moral potency might
report inaccurately low rates of department-wide UPB.
Another more optimistic explanation is that the presence of even a single
employee with high moral potency can truly have a significant effect on the rates of UPB
within their department. One of the defining characteristics of individuals with moral
potency act is that they act with conviction to uphold their ethical values, no matter the
obstacles (Hannah et al., 2011). Perhaps through constantly role modeling ethical
behavior and forcibly opposing unethical behavior, individual employees with high moral
potency are capable of significantly reducing department-wide UPB.
Moral potency’s interaction with organizational identification.
Individuals’ moral potency was found to moderate the effect of individuals’
organizational identification on their willingness to engage in UPB. This was expected, as
moral potency represents one’s willingness to take the ethical course of action despite
any pressure (internal or external) to act unethically (Hannah et al., 2011). Organizational
identification exerted the single largest positive effect on individuals’ willingness to
engage in UPB. The fact that moral potency exerted the largest negative effect on
individuals’ UPB and also helped to control the largest positive effect on individuals’
UPB demonstrates the critical importance of moral potency for predicting individuals’
willingness towards UPB in the workplace.
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The present study was the first to examine the effect of moral potency on UPB;
the findings highlight the continued need to study this construct as a means of predicting
and even reducing UPB in the workplace. Although conceptualized as an individual-level
internal attribute, the relationships that moral potency demonstrated with departmental
UPB and departmental ethical climate suggest that an individual employee’s moral
potency has the potential to affect the attitudes and behaviors of the surrounding group.
Also, despite being considered as a stable trait, the correlation with ethical climate also
suggests that employees’ moral potency may be affected by their surrounding
environment, indicating the potential to increase employees’ moral potency through
organizational interventions.
Goals climate.
The goals climate measure used in this study showed significant psychometric
issues. Although goals climate was expected to be a single factor, CFA results indicated a
two factor structure. Several items were also dropped due to low reliability. Although
there was a promising theoretical basis for the two factor structure, and a reasonable
argument for a relationship between pressuring goals climate and UPB, no significant
main effects were found between either of the goals climate dimension and UPB. An
interaction was found between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting
individuals’ UPB, but the lack of a main effect from pressuring goals climate made the
results of this interaction difficult to interpret. These findings suggest a need to redesign
the goals climate measure, using more robust theoretically-driven methods.
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Goals Climate Scale factor structure.
Due to poor fit, the original single Goals Climate Scale factor was separated into
two, and the resulting two factors did not fit well as a single second order factor. Still, the
two factors that emerged from the Goals Climate Scale demonstrate a potential new
categorization on which to assess goals climate. The single goals climate factor was
separated into dimensions: pressuring goals climate and empowering goals climate.
Although both dimensions relate to individuals’ perceptions of the importance of
achieving departmental goals, the items within the pressuring goals climate dimension
center on management emphasis of goals (Meeting goals is a top priority of the
management in my department) and the presence of negative consequences if goals are
not reached (If goals in the department are not met, employees could face negative jobrelated consequences). In contrast, the items in the empowering goals climate dimension
relate to the extent to which employees are involved in goals achievement strategies
(Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how best to meet department
goals) and given the necessary tools to be successful on department goals (Training
programs in my department primarily focus on how to achieve goals).
These two goals climate dimensions seem to align with the two strategies for
pursuing goals outlined in regulatory focus theory: prevention focus and promotion focus
(Higgins, 1998). According to regulatory focus theory, those with a prevention focus are
motivated to fulfill concrete duties and obligations and to avoid undesirable outcomes,
whereas those with a promotion focus are motivated by a need for accomplishment and
forward progress, and desire to maximize future gains. Pressuring goals climate, which is
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characterized by management control and punitive consequences, seems to frame goals
climate using a prevention focus. Empowering goals climate, which involves developing
employees’ goal achievement potential and strategizing on how best to reach goals,
aligns nicely with promotion focus. Individuals have a trait predisposition towards a
particular regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998), but situational context and framing can also
influence individuals’ regulatory focus (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002).
Theoretically, this could mean that a strong pressuring goals climate could increase
employees’ prevention focus for goal achievement, while a strong empowering goals
climate could increase employees’ promotion focus. Past research suggests that
individuals are more likely to engage in UPB to prevent a loss than to achieve a gain
(Beams, Brown, & Killough, 2003) and that the use of loss framing can increase
willingness towards UPB (Graham et al., 2015). This indicates that a high pressuring
goals climate may have a stronger effect on increasing UPB than an empowering goals
climate.
Goals climate and UPB.
No main effects were found between either goals climate dimension and
individuals’ UPB or departmental UPB. Perhaps, as asserted in organizational climate
theory, strategic outcome climates only influence employee behavior when the
prerequisite foundational climates are in place to provide the necessary supportive
environment (Schneider et al., 2011). This would suggest that strategic climates like
goals climate effect relevant outcomes entirely through interactions with foundational
climates such as ethical climate, and have no main effect on their own. A significant
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interaction was found between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate as predicted,
but in the absence of a main effect between pressuring goals climate and UPB, the effect
of the interaction is perplexing. The results indicate that as expected, pressuring goals
climate has a positive effect on individuals’ UPB when ethical climate is high. However,
the results also suggest that when ethical climate is low, pressuring goals climate has a
negative relationship with individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Based on the
foundational climate argument, the relationship between pressuring goals climate and
UPB should be flat when ethical climate is low and become positive as ethical climate
increases.
Perhaps the combination of a high pressuring goals climate and low ethical
climate creates a sufficiently toxic environment that employees are motivated to act
counterproductively against the organization. This would increase certain types of
unethical workplace behaviors such as employee theft and sabotage, but would decrease
UPB. Perhaps the interaction between ethical climate and goals climate is in fact
curvilinear rather than linear, starting flat at low ethical climate before sloping upwards
and becoming positive at moderate and high levels of ethical climate. This interaction
would create simple slopes for goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB that would
comply with the foundational climate theory, without the need for goals climate to have a
positive main effect.
Another likely explanation for the present study’s unexpected results involving
goals climate is that this study’s Goals Climate Scale did not accurately represent the
goals climate construct, and therefore was ineffective for testing the true relationship
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between goals climate and UPB. There are several factors that favor this explanation,
including the fact that the Goals Climate Scale has undergone multiple adaptations, had
never been validated as a measure of goals climate, and demonstrated major
psychometric issues during this study’s CFA. The significant interaction found between
pressuring goals climate and ethical climate indicates some effectiveness of the Goals
Climate Scale to predict UPB, but the questionable validity of the Goals Climate Scale
dampens the credibility and interpretability of this finding.
Moral ideology and UPB.
Like with goals climate, the majority of the hypotheses involving individuals’
moral ideology were not supported. A significant negative effect was found between
individuals’ idealism and individuals’ willingness towards UPB as predicted, but this
effect was only supported in two out of three versions of the Final Model. When
controlling for method effects with the IM marker variable, the effect of idealism on
individuals’ UPB was reduced slightly, which was sufficient to make the effect no longer
significant. Idealism was not found to interact with ethical climate, organizational
identification, or goals climate to predict individuals’ willingness towards UPB.
Relativism did not significantly predict individuals’ intentions towards UPB in any way,
whether through a main effect or an interaction.
It should be noted that at least some of the effect of idealism on individuals’
willingness towards UPB was diminished due to having shared explained variance with
moral potency, another individual difference variable. Idealism and moral potency were
highly correlated and both had a strong negative correlation with individuals’ willingness
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towards UPB, although moral potency’s negative correlation with individuals’ UPB was
larger. It is likely that the negative effect of idealism on individuals’ willingness towards
UPB would have been stronger if moral potency had not been included in the model.
Another explanation for the unexpectedly weak effect of idealism on UPB is that,
because the items in the Idealism subscale refer to individual potential victims, the scale
is less relevant for predicting UPB than anticipated. The idealism construct theoretically
measures the extent of one’s concern for the welfare of all people when making
decisions, but the items within the Idealism subscale often reference a singular potential
victim (e.g., never intentionally harm another; harm another person; welfare of another
individual). When employees commit UPB in the workplace, the potential victims are
often dispersed and unidentified. For example, the victims of Volkswagen’s diesel
emissions fraud were the deceived customers and the global environment; the engineers
responsible for the fraud most likely did not have direct contact with individual victims.
Because the Idealism subscale mostly indexes concern for individual potential victims,
this variable may not be as effective for predicting UPB as was predicted in this study.
It could also be that problems with the EPQ (Forsyth, 1980), the scale used to
measure ethical ideology, limited this study’s capacity to predict the true relationship
between individuals’ ethical ideology and UPB. Although the factor structure of the EPQ
was as expected, several items from both the idealism and relativism subscales had to be
removed due to low reliability. Compared to the other measures included in this study,
most items from the EPQ were longer, required a higher reading level, and used unusual
expressions. The items from the relativism subscale were particularly challenging (e.g.,
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Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in
the way of better human relations and adjustment). Although the EPQ is well supported
as a valid predictor of ethical decision making and has been used in more than 50
empirical studies, perhaps the 37 year old scale has become somewhat outdated. It seems
likely that a scale using more up-to-date language and straightforward sentence structure
may more accurately measure the ethical ideology of the average worker, and therefore
may be a more valid predictor of that worker’s intentions towards UPB.
Limitations and Future Directions
Ethical climate.
This study advanced the understanding of the complex relationship between
ethical climate and UPB, but still left many questions unanswered. The curvilinear
relationship between ethical climate and UPB was supported, but the significance of the
simple slopes at various levels of ethical climate were not tested due to practical
statistical constraints. Future research should test the significance of these simple slopes
to determine the level of ethical climate that is necessary to significantly reduce
individuals’ willingness towards UPB. These tests would also be able to identify which
levels of ethical climate are most likely to increase UPB.
Future research should also seek an explanation for why highly ethical climates
appear to be exponentially more effective at reducing UPB than other levels of ethical
climate. Perhaps future research could measure certain ethical climate antecedents, such
as ethical policies and protocols, to test the theory that highly ethical climates are
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distinctive due to their consistent alignment of all workplace cues that contribute to
perceptions of ethical climate.
Although the hypothesized interaction was found between ethical climate and
pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB, the simple slopes of the interaction
did not conform to the foundational climate argument because there was no main effect
for pressuring goals climate. One potential explanation is that ethical climate’s interaction
with other climates is curvilinear rather than linear. Future research should investigate
this by testing for more complex interactions between ethical climate and other
workplace climates when predicting UPB.
Finally, moral motivation was found to be the most important dimension within
ethical climate for predicting UPB. Regrettably, because this study used the abridged
version of the ECI, the Moral Motivation factor was measured with only three items.
Future UPB research may benefit from including the full version of this subscale rather
than the shorted version, in order to have a more reliable measure of this most important
ethical climate dimension for predicting UPB.
Study design.
Many of the limitations of this study were due to the distributed participant
sample and the cross-sectional survey design.
This study’s non-aggregated sample most likely limited the effect of ethical
climate to predict department-level UPB. Future research using an aggregated
organizational sample would be a major advancement for UPB research, as it would
allow for more accurate representations of department-level variables. This would

148

generate more accurate predictions of how a department’s ethical climate affects
department-level UPB. An aggregated design would be better suited to determine if the
relationship between ethical climate and departmental UPB is curvilinear or linear, and
would also be helpful for testing interactions between multiple climates to predict
department-level UPB.
Although there are theoretical arguments for the causal direction of the
relationships tested in this study, the cross-sectional design prevented the development of
any causal conclusions from the findings. Future studies should consider a longitudinal
design in order to provide empirical causal support for the theoretical mechanisms behind
individuals’ willingness towards UPB.
Moral potency.
This study found that moral potency has a profound effect on UPB at the
individual level, and even influences UPB at the department level. Future research should
continue to study moral potency as an avenue for predicting UPB, and perhaps as an
intervention strategy for reducing UPB in the workplace. It would be valuable to develop
a better understanding of the unexpected relationships found between individuals’ moral
potency and the attitudes and behaviors of coworkers within the department. Using a
longitudinal design and an aggregated sample, future research could test the causal
relationships between individuals’ moral potency and department-level ethical climate
and individuals’ moral potency and department-level UPB. Another potential avenue for
research is to study potential strategies for increasing individuals’ moral potency. This
could be a useful tool for organizations to reduce the risk of UPB in the workplace.
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Organizational concern and ethical sensitivity.
This study measured individuals’ organizational identification as a proxy for
organizational concern, as there are no scales currently available to measure
organizational concern directly. To provide more concrete support for the theory of the
dueling motivational mechanisms predicting UPB, it would be useful for future research
to develop measures of organizational concern and ethical sensitivity. Having valid
measures for these theoretical constructs would advance UPB research by conclusively
demonstrating the motivational mechanisms behind UPB.
Goals Climate Scale.
This study encountered many challenges involving the Goals Climate Scale. CFA
results indicated that the scale had some reliability issues as well as serious
dimensionality issues. Despite best efforts to address these problems through post hoc
revisions, the majority of the predicted effects of goals climate were not supported.
Future research should address this by developing a more theoretically valid and
statistically robust measure of goals climate that can be used to further our understanding
of how climates interact to predict UPB.
Ethical ideology.
The EPQ also demonstrated some psychometric issues and was mostly ineffective
in predicting UPB. Revisions to modernize the EPQ would likely increase its validity for
measuring idealism and relativism, and may increase its predictive validity for studying
UPB. However, considering the overlap between the constructs of idealism and moral
potency and moral potency’s superior predictive validity on UPB, it may be unnecessary

150

to include both personal morality variables in future studies. Rather than including all
possible variables, it may be more beneficial for future UPB research to focus on
developing an effective yet parsimonious model for understanding the mechanisms
behind individuals’ willingness towards UPB.
Practical Conclusions
Employees are motivated to commit UPB due to organizational concern, or their
desire to help the organization succeed. For this reason, UPB is often not associated with
the same predictors as other unethical workplace behaviors. UPB may be more common
in supportive organizations that prioritize the ethical treatment of their employees. Also,
employees who engage in UPB tend to have high organizational identification, and
therefore may not fit the profile of a typical “problem” employee.
The motivating factor that influences employees away from UPB is ethical
sensitivity, or the extent that they value ethical considerations when making decisions.
Individuals’ ethical sensitivity is influenced by environmental factors like the ethical
climate of the workplace and internal factors such as moral potency.
Although it would seem logical that improving the ethical climate in the
workplace would be an effective way to discourage UPB, the relationship between ethical
climate and UPB is complicated. Higher ethical climates increase employees’ ethical
sensitivity, but the supportive workplace environment that ethical climates create also
increases workers’ organizational concern. It seems that although higher ethical climates
do tend to reduce UPB overall, having a moderately ethical climate can actually increase
UPB compared to a low ethical climate. It may be that only highly ethical climates
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significantly reduce individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Moreover, even a highly
ethical climate may be ineffective in controlling UPB in workplaces that put a very strong
emphasis on achieving organizational goals.
Along with the workplace environment, employees’ individual differences also
play a large role in shaping individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Moral potency has
been found to play a critical role in reducing UPB, both within the individual and
department-wide. Moral potency refers to an individual’s sense of responsibility to make
ethical choices, personal conviction to uphold moral values in the face of opposition, and
confidence in their ability to achieve an ethical outcome. This combination of internal
attributes not only vastly decreases one’s own UPB tendencies, but also seems to
influence coworkers’ behavior and departmental ethical climate. Organizations should
promote the expression of moral potency in the workplace, and perhaps look for ways to
actively increase the moral potency of employees.
Although employees’ organizational concern is understandably valued and
encouraged by all organizations, this study demonstrates the potential unintended
consequences when employees’ organizational concern outweighs their ethical
sensitivity. Organizations must be aware of the role that employee attitudes like
organizational identification and traits like moral potency have on influencing UPB in
order to recognize potential problems before they occur. Organizations must also be
conscious of the ethical climate and goals climate within their workplace and consider the
message that the workplace climate sends to employees. If an organization plans to
improve its ethical climate as a means of discouraging UPB, the organization must
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commit to achieving a highly ethical climate that unequivocally sends the message that
ethical values should never be compromised.
Organizations must find effective strategies to prevent UPB, not only to fulfill
their ethical responsibility to their stakeholders, but also to protect the company’s
reputation and bottom line. Although more research is needed, the results of this study
suggest that organizations can assess their risk by monitoring workplace ethical climate,
goals climate, and employee moral potency, and reduce their overall risk through
maintaining a highly ethical climate.
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Appendix A
Ethical Climate Index
Moral Awareness
1. People around here are aware of ethical issues.
2. People in my department recognize a moral dilemma right away.
3. People in my department are very sensitive to ethical problems.
Empathetic Concern
1. People in my department sympathize with someone who is having difficulties in
their job.
2. For the most part, when people around here see that someone is treated unfairly,
they feel pity for that person.
3. People around here feel bad for someone who is being taken advantage of.
4. In my department people feel sorry for someone who is having problems.
Focus on Self
1. People around here are mostly out for themselves.
2. People in my department think of their own welfare first when faced with a
difficult decision.
3. In my Department people’s primary concern is their own personal benefit.
Focus on Others
1. People around here have a strong sense of responsibility to society and humanity.
2. What is best for everyone in the department is the major consideration.
3. The most important concern is the good of all the people in the department.
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Moral Motivation
1. In my department people are willing to break the rules in order to advance in the
company.
2. Around here, power is more important than honesty.
3. In order to control scarce resources, people in my department are willing to
compromise their ethical values somewhat.
Moral Character
1. People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that person were not
a very helpful person.
2. People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake.
3. No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are always
responsible for whatever they do.
Note: From publication by Arnaud (2010).

156

Appendix B
Goals Climate Scale
1. Management in my department places a strong emphasis on meeting goals.
2. The achieving of goals drives most decisions at my department.
3. Meeting goals is a top priority of the management in my department.
4. The main focus in my department is on meeting goals. Everything else is secondary.
5. There is frequent communication about issues related to meeting goals in my
department.
6. Employees in my department are able to discuss goal achievement issues in meetings.
7. Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how best to meet
department goals.
8. How to meet department goals is given high priority in training programs for
employees in my department.
9. Employees in my department receive comprehensive training regarding how best to
meet their goals.
10. Training programs for employees in my department primarily focus on how to
achieve goals.
11. Performance evaluations for employees in my department are primarily based on
whether employees did their part to help the company meet goals.
12. If goals in the department are not met, employees could face negative job-related
consequences.
13. Management in my department praises employees that help the company meet goals.
Note: Adapted from Productivity Climate Scale, published by Jiang and Probst (2015).
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Appendix C
Organizational Identification
1. When someone criticizes my company, it feels like a personal insult.
2. I am very interested in what others think about my company.
3. When I talk about this company, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’.
4. This company’s successes are my successes.
5. When someone praises this company, it feels like a personal compliment.
6. If a story in the media criticized the company, I would feel embarrassed.
Note: From publication by Mael and Ashforth (1992).
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Appendix D
Ethical Position Questionnaire
Idealism
1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another
even to a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks
might be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the
benefits to be gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any may threaten the dignity
and welfare of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences
of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any
society.
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
10. Moral action are those which closely match the ideals of the most “perfect”
action.
Relativism
1. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be part of
any code of ethics.
2. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.
3. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person
considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
4. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to “rightness.”
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5. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is
moral or immoral is up to the individual.
6. Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should
behave, and are not to be applied in making judgments of others.
7. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
8. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could
stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
9. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not
permissible totally depends on the situation.
10. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends on the circumstances
surrounding the action.
Note: From publication by Forsyth (1980).
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Appendix E
Moral Potency Questionnaire
Moral Courage
1. I will confront my peers if they commit an unethical act.
Moral Ownership
1. I will assume responsibility to take action when I see an unethical act.
Moral Efficacy
1. I am confident that I can readily see the moral/ethical implications in the
challenges I face.
Note: Full scale is not included due to its proprietary nature. For information on how to
obtain the full scale, see publication by Hannah and Avolio (2010).
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Appendix F
Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior
1. If it would help my organization, I would misrepresent the truth to make my
organization look good.
2. If it would help my organization, I would exaggerate the truth about my company’s
products or services to customers and clients.
3. If it would help my organization, I would withhold negative information about my
company or its products from customers and clients.
4. If my organization needed me to, I would give a good recommendation on the behalf
of an incompetent employee in the hope that the person will become another
organization’s problem instead of my own.
5. If my organization needed me to, I would withhold issuing a refund to a customer or
client accidentally overcharged.
6. If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could be damaging to my
organization.
Note: From publication by Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell (2010).
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Appendix G
Departmental Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior
How frequently have you seen the following behaviors from members of your
department?
1. Employees misrepresenting the truth to make the organization look good.
2. Employees exaggerating the truth about the company’s products or services to
customers and clients.
3. Employees withholding negative information about the company or its products
from customers and clients.
4. Employees giving a good recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent
employee in the hope that the person will become another organization’s problem.
5. Employees withholding issuing a refund to a customer or client accidentally
overcharged.
6. Employees concealing information from the public that could be damaging to my
organization.
Note: Adapted from publication by Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell (2010).
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Appendix H
Fear Tolerance
1. I tend to face my fears.
2. If the thought of something makes me anxious, I usually will avoid it.
3. Even if I feel terriﬁed, I will stay in that situation until I have done what I need to do.
4. If something scares me, I try to get away from it.
5. Other people describe me as courageous.
6. I would describe myself as ‘‘chicken’’.
7. I will do things even though they seem to be dangerous.
8. I act in a courageous way.
9. If I am worried or anxious about something, I will do or face it anyway.
10. If there is an important reason to face something that scares me, I will face it.
11. Even if something scares me, I will not back down.
12. I will not face something I fear, even if avoiding it will have a negative outcome for
me.
Note: From publication by Norton and Weiss (2009).
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Appendix I
Impression Management
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
2. I never cover up my mistakes.
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
4. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
5. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
6. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
7. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
8. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
Note: From the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form, in publication
by Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, and Gebauer (2015).

165

REFERENCES
Allmon, D. E., Page, D., & Roberts, R. (2000). Determinants of perceptions of cheating:
Ethical orientation, personality and demographics. Journal of Business Ethics,
23(4), 411-422.
Andreoli, N., & Lefkowitz, J. (2009). Individual and organizational antecedents of
misconduct in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(3), 309-332.
Arnaud, A. (2006). A new theory and measure of ethical work climate: The Psychological
Process Model (PPM) and the Ethical Climate Index (ECI). University of Central
Florida Orlando, Florida.
Arnaud, A. (2010). Conceptualizing and measuring ethical work climate: Development
and validation of the Ethical Climate Index. Business & Society, 49(2), 345-358.
Arnaud, A., & Schminke, M. (2012). The ethical climate and context of organizations: A
comprehensive model. Organization Science, 23(6), 1767-1780.
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy
of Management review, 14(1), 20-39.
Astakhova, M. N., & Porter, G. (2015). Understanding the work passion–performance
relationship: The mediating role of organizational identification and moderating
role of fit at work. Human Relations, 68(8), 1315-1346.
Avey, J. B., Avolio, B. J., Crossley, C. D., & Luthans, F. (2009). Psychological
ownership: Theoretical extensions, measurement and relation to work outcomes.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 30(2), 173-191.

166

Babin, B. J., Boles, J. S., & Robin, D. P. (2000). Representing the perceived ethical work
climate among marketing employees. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 28(3), 345-358.
Bandura, A., & Walters, R. H. (1977). Social learning theory.
Barnett, T., Bass, K., & Brown, G. (1994). Ethical ideology and ethical judgment
regarding ethical issues in business. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(6), 469-480.
Bartels, L. K., Harrick, E., Martell, K., & Strickland, D. (1998). The relationship between
ethical climate and ethical problems within human resource management. Journal
of Business Ethics, 17(7), 799–804.
Beams, J. D., Brown, R. M., & Killough, L. N. (2003). An experiment testing the
determinants of non-compliance with insider trading laws. Journal of Business
Ethics, 45(4), 309-323.
Behrend, T. S., Sharek, D. J., Meade, A. W., & Wiebe, E. N. (2011). The viability of
crowdsourcing for survey research. Behavior Research Methods, 43(3), 800-813.
Bollen, K. A. (1989). A new incremental fit index for general structural equation
models. Sociological Methods & Research, 17(3), 303-316.
Borman, W. C. (2004). The concept of organizational citizenship. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 13(6), 238-241.
Bratton, W. W. (2012). Does corporate law protect the interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders?: Enron and the dark side of shareholder value. Tulane Law Review,
61.

167

Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1980). The Lagrange multiplier test and its applications
to model specification in econometrics. The Review of Economic Studies, 47(1),
239-253.
Brown, T. (2006). Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Brown, M. E., Treviño, L. K., & Harrison, D. A. (2005). Ethical leadership: A social
learning perspective for construct development and testing. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 117-134.
Buchan, H. F. (2005). Ethical decision making in the public accounting profession: An
extension of Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior. Journal of Business
Ethics, 61(2), 165-181.
Cadogan, J. W., Lee, N., Tarkiainen, A., & Sundqvist, S. (2009). Sales manager and sales
team determinants of salesperson ethical behaviour. European Journal of
Marketing, 43(7-8), 907-937.
Carr, J. Z., Schmidt, A. M., Ford, J. K., & DeShon, R. P. (2003). Climate perceptions
matter: a meta-analytic path analysis relating molar climate, cognitive and
affective states, and individual level work outcomes. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 88(4), 605.
Carter, N. T., Dalal, D. K., Boyce, A. S., O’Connell, M. S., Kung, M.-C., & Delgado, K.
M. (2014). Uncovering curvilinear relationships between conscientiousness and
job performance: How theoretically appropriate measurement makes an empirical
difference. Journal of Applied Psychology, 99(4), 564.

168

Castille, C. M., Buckner, J. E., & Thoroughgood, C. N. (2016). Prosocial citizens without
a moral compass? Examining the relationship between Machiavellianism and
unethical pro-organizational behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-12.
Chappell, B. (Producer). (2015, April 13 2016). 'It Was Installed For This Purpose,' VW's
U.S. CEO Tells Congress about Defeat Device. NPR.
Chew, J. (2015, September 30). Investors are suing Volkswagen over its stock drop.
Fortune.
Colquitt, J. A., Noe, R. A., & Jackson, C. L. (2002). Justice in teams: Antecedents and
consequences of procedural justice climate. Personnel Psychology, 55(1), 83-109.
Cortina, J. M., Chen, G., & Dunlap, W. P. (2001). Testing interaction effects in LISREL:
Examination and illustration of available procedures. Organizational research
methods, 4(4), 324-360.
Cullen, J. B., Victor, B., & Bronson, J. W. (1993). The ethical climate questionnaire: An
assessment of its development and validity. Psychological reports, 73(2), 667674.
Curran, P. J., West, S. G., & Finch, J. F. (1996). The robustness of test statistics to
nonnormality and specification error in confirmatory factor
analysis. Psychological Methods, 1(1), 16.
Davis, M. A., Andersen, M. G., & Curtis, M. B. (2001). Measuring ethical ideology in
business ethics: A critical analysis of the ethics position questionnaire. Journal of
Business Ethics, 32(1), 35-53.

169

DeConinck, J. B. (2003). The effect of punishment on sales managers' outcome
expectancies and responses to unethical sales force behavior. American Business
Review, 21(2), 135.
Demirtas, O., & Akdogan, A. A. (2014). The effect of ethical leadership behavior on
ethical climate, turnover intention, and affective commitment. Journal of Business
Ethics, 1-9.
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation:
Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management review, 20(1), 6591.
Effelsberg, D., Solga, M., & Gurt, J. (2014). Transformational leadership and follower’s
unethical behavior for the benefit of the company: A two-study investigation.
Journal of Business Ethics, 120(1), 81-93.
Ehrhart, M. G. (2004). Leadership and procedural justice climate as antecedents of unit ‐
level organizational citizenship behavior. Personnel Psychology, 57(1), 61-94.
Ehrhart, M. G., & Raver, J. L. (2014). The effects of organizational climate and culture
on productive and counterproductive behavior. The Oxford Handbook of
Organizational Climate and Culture, 153.
Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of personality and
social psychology, 39(1), 175.
Freitas, A. L., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2002). Regulatory fit and resisting
temptation during goal pursuit. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(3),
291-298.

170

Gils, S., Hogg, M. A., Van Quaquebeke, N., & van Knippenberg, D. (2015). When
organizational identification elicits moral decision-making: A matter of the right
climate. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-14.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American
sociological review, 161-178.
Graham, K. A., Ziegert, J. C., & Capitano, J. (2015). The effect of leadership style,
framing, and promotion regulatory focus on unethical pro-organizational
behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 126(3), 423-436.
Hannah, S. T., & Avolio, B. J. (2010). Moral potency: Building the capacity for
character-based leadership. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and
Research, 62(4), 291.
Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & May, D. R. (2011). Moral maturation and moral conation:
A capacity approach to explaining moral thought and action. Academy of
Management review, 36(4), 663-685.
Hannah, S. T., Jennings, P. L., Bluhm, D., Peng, A. C., & Schaubroeck, J. M. (2014).
Duty orientation: Theoretical development and preliminary construct testing.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 220-238.
Hannah, S. T., Schaubroeck, J. M., Peng, A. C., Lord, R. G., Trevino, L. K., Kozlowski,
S. W., & Doty, J. (2013). Joint influences of individual and work unit abusive
supervision on ethical intentions and behaviors: A moderated mediation model.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(4), 579.

171

Hart, C. M., Ritchie, T. D., Hepper, E. G., & Gebauer, J. E. (2015). The Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16). SAGE Open, 5(4),
2158244015621113.
Henderson, B. C., & Kaplan, S. E. (2005). An examination of the role of ethics in tax
compliance decisions. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 27(1), 3972.
Henle, C. A., Giacalone, R. A., & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2005). The role of ethical ideology
in workplace deviance. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(3), 219-230.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational
principle. Advances in experimental social psychology, 30, 1-46.
Hofmann, D. A., Morgeson, F. P., & Gerras, S. J. (2003). Climate as a moderator of the
relationship between leader-member exchange and content specific citizenship:
safety climate as an exemplar. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(1), 170.
Ilie, A. (2012). Unethical Pro-Organizational Behaviors: Antecedents and Boundary
Conditions.
Jiang, L., & Probst, T. M. (2015). The relationship between safety–production conflict
and employee safety outcomes: Testing the impact of multiple organizational
climates. Work & Stress, 29(2), 171-189.
Kalshoven, K., Den Hartog, D. N., & De Hoogh, A. H. (2013). Ethical leadership and
follower helping and courtesy: Moral awareness and empathic concern as
moderators. Applied Psychology, 62(2), 211-235.

172

Kelley, S. W., & Dorsch, M. J. (1991). Ethical climate, organizational commitment, and
indebtedness among purchasing executives. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales
Management, 11(4), 55-66.
Kish-Gephart, J. J., Harrison, D. A., & Treviño, L. K. (2010). Bad apples, bad cases, and
bad barrels: meta-analytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(1), 1.
Kuenzi, M., & Schminke, M. (2009). Assembling fragments into a lens: A review,
critique, and proposed research agenda for the organizational work climate
literature. Journal of Management.
Landers, R. N., & Behrend, T. S. (2015). An inconvenient truth: Arbitrary distinctions
between organizational, Mechanical Turk, and other convenience samples.
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 8(02), 142-164.
LePine, J. A., Erez, A., & Johnson, D. E. (2002). The nature and dimensionality of
organizational citizenship behavior: a critical review and meta-analysis. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 87(1), 52.
Liao, H., & Rupp, D. E. (2005). The impact of justice climate and justice orientation on
work outcomes: a cross-level multifoci framework. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 90(2), 242.
MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediation analysis. Annual
Review of Psychology, 58, 593-614.

173

Mael, F., & Ashforth, B. E. (1992). Alumni and their alma mater: A partial test of the
reformulated model of organizational identification. Journal of Organizational
behavior, 13(2), 103-123.
Marsh, H. W., Hau, K. T., & Wen, Z. (2004). In search of golden rules: Comment on
hypothesis-testing approaches to setting cutoff values for fit indexes and dangers
in overgeneralizing Hu and Bentler's (1999) findings. Structural equation
modeling, 11(3), 320-341.
Marsh, H., Wen, Z., & Hau, K. (2004). Structural equation models of latent interactions:
Evaluation of alternative estimation strategies and indicator construction.
Psychological Methods, 9, 275–300
Martin, K. D., & Cullen, J. B. (2006). Continuities and extensions of ethical climate
theory: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Business Ethics, 69(2), 175-194.
Mascaro, L. (2015, May 31). NSA bulk collection of phone data stops; Senate fails to act
before deadline. Online Periodical. Los Angeles Times.
Matherne III, C. F., & Litchfield, S. R. (2012). Investigating the relationship between
affective commitment and unethical pro-organizational behaviors: The role of
moral identity. Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics, 9(5), 35-46.
Mathiesen, K., & Neslen, A. (2015, September 23). VW scandal caused nearly 1m tonnes
of extra pollution, analysis shows. The Guardian.
May, D. R., Gilson, R. L., & Harter, L. M. (2004). The psychological conditions of
meaningfulness, safety and availability and the engagement of the human spirit at
work. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 77(1), 11-37.

174

Mayer, D. M. (2014). A review of the literature on ethical climate and culture. The
Oxford Handbook of Organizational Climate and Culture, 415.
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., & Greenbaum, M. (2009). Making ethical climate a
mainstream management topic. Cremer, D. eds., 181-213.
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., & Greenbaum, R. L. (2010). Examining the link between
ethical leadership and employee misconduct: The mediating role of ethical
climate. Journal of Business Ethics, 95(1), 7-16.
Meade, A. W., & Craig, S. B. (2012). Identifying careless responses in survey
data. Psychological methods, 17(3), 437.
Miao, Q., Newman, A., Yu, J., & Xu, L. (2013). The relationship between ethical
leadership and unethical pro-organizational behavior: Linear or curvilinear
effects? Journal of Business Ethics, 116(3), 641-653.
Moore, C., Detert, J. R., Klebe Treviño, L., Baker, V. L., & Mayer, D. M. (2012). Why
employees do bad things: Moral disengagement and unethical organizational
behavior. Personnel Psychology, 65(1), 1-48.
Murphy, P. R., & Free, C. (2015). Broadening the fraud triangle: Instrumental climate
and fraud. Behavioral Research in Accounting.
Neal, A., Griffin, M. A., & Hart, P. M. (2000). The impact of organizational climate on
safety climate and individual behavior. Safety science, 34(1), 99-109.
Neubert, M. J., Carlson, D. S., Kacmar, K. M., Roberts, J. A., & Chonko, L. B. (2009).
The virtuous influence of ethical leadership behavior: Evidence from the field.
Journal of Business Ethics, 90(2), 157-170.

175

Ng, T. W., & Feldman, D. C. (2015). Ethical leadership: Meta-analytic evidence of
criterion-related and incremental validity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(3),
948.
Norton, P. J., & Weiss, B. J. (2009). The role of courage on behavioral approach in a
fear-eliciting situation: A proof-of-concept pilot study. Journal of anxiety
disorders, 23(2), 212-217.
O’Fallon, M. J., & Butterfield, K. D. (2005). A review of the empirical ethical decisionmaking literature: 1996–2003. Journal of Business Ethics, 59(4), 375-413.
Ong, A. D., & Weiss, D. J. (2000). The impact of anonymity on responses to sensitive
questions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(8), 1691-1708.
Organ, D. W. (1990). The motivational basis of organizational citizenship behavior.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 12(1), 43-72.
Ostroff, C. (1993). The effects of climate and personal influences on individual behavior
and attitudes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 56(1), 56-90.
Ostroff, C., Kinicki, A. J., & Tamkins, M. M. (2003). Organizational Culture and
Climate. Wiley Online Library.
Pan, Y., & Sparks, J. R. (2012). Predictors, consequence, and measurement of ethical
judgments: Review and meta-analysis. Journal of business research, 65(1), 84-91.
Peterson, D. K. (2002). The relationship between unethical behavior and the dimensions
of the ethical climate questionnaire. Journal of Business Ethics, 41(4), 313-326.

176

Pierce, J. R., & Aguinis, H. (2015). Detrimental citizenship behaviour: A multilevel
framework of antecedents and consequences. Management and Organization
Review, 11(1), 69-99.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common
method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879.
Rest, J. R. (1986). Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory. Praeger
Publishers.
Robertson, D. C., & Anderson, E. (1993). Control system and task environment effects
on ethical judgment: An exploratory study of industrial salespeople. Organization
Science, 4(4), 617-644.
Román, S., & Luis Munuera, J. (2005). Determinants and consequences of ethical
behaviour: an empirical study of salespeople. European Journal of Marketing,
39(5/6), 473-495.
Ross Jr, W. T., & Robertson, D. C. (2003). A typology of situational factors: Impact on
salesperson decision-making about ethical issues. Journal of Business Ethics,
46(3), 213-234.
Ross, W. T., & Robertson, D. C. (2000). Lying: The impact of decision context. Business
Ethics Quarterly, 10(2), 409-440.
Schaubroeck, J., Hannah, S., Avolio, B., Kozlowski, S., Lord, R., & Trevino, L. (2010).
Excellence in character and ethical leadership (EXCEL) study. Center for the
Army Profession and Ethics Technical Report, 1.

177

Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. (2011). Perspectives on organizational
climate and culture. APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology,
1, 373-414.
Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. (2013). Organizational climate and
culture. Annual review of psychology, 64, 361-388.
Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., Mayer, D. M., Saltz, J. L., & Niles-Jolly, K. (2005).
Understanding organization-customer links in service settings. Academy of
Management Journal, 48(6), 1017-1032.
Schneider, B., Macey, W. H., Lee, W. C., & Young, S. A. (2009). Organizational service
climate drivers of the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and financial
and market performance. Journal of Service Research, 12(1), 3-14.
Schulte, M., Ostroff, C., & Kinicki, A. J. (2006). Organizational climate systems and
psychological climate perceptions: A cross-level study of climate-satisfaction
relationships. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 79(4),
645-671.
Schulte, M., Ostroff, C., Shmulyian, S., & Kinicki, A. (2009). Organizational climate
configurations: Relationships to collective attitudes, customer satisfaction, and
financial performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(3), 618.
Schwepker, C. H. (2001). Ethical climate's relationship to job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, and turnover intention in the salesforce. Journal of Business
Research, 54(1), 39-52.

178

Sheehan, K., & Pittman, M. (2016). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for Academics. Melvin
& Leigh.
Simola, S. K., Barling, J., & Turner, N. (2010). Transformational leadership and leader
moral orientation: Contrasting an ethic of justice and an ethic of care. The
leadership quarterly, 21(1), 179-188.
Simons, T., & Roberson, Q. (2003). Why managers should care about fairness: The
effects of aggregate justice perceptions on organizational outcomes. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 88(3), 432.
Sluss, D. M., & Ashforth, B. E. (2008). How relational and organizational identification
converge: Processes and conditions. Organization Science, 19(6), 807-823.
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural
equation models. In S. Leinhart (Ed.), Sociological Methodology 1982 (pp. 290312). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Treviño, L. K., & Ball, G. A. (1992). The social implications of punishing unethical
behavior: Observers' cognitive and affective reactions. Journal of Management,
18(4), 751-768.
Treviño, L. K., Butterfield, K. D., & McCabe, D. L. (1998). The ethical context in
organizations: Influences on employee attitudes and behaviors. Business Ethics
Quarterly, 8(03), 447-476.
Treviño, L. K., Hartman, L. P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and moral manager:
How executives develop a reputation for ethical leadership. California
Management Review, 42(4), 128142.

179

Tseng, F. C., & Fan, Y. J. (2011). Exploring the influence of organizational ethical
climate on knowledge management. Journal of Business Ethics, 101(2), 325-342.
Umphress, E. E., & Bingham, J. B. (2011). When employees do bad things for good
reasons: Examining unethical pro-organizational behaviors. Organization Science,
22(3), 621-640. doi:10.1287/orsc.1100.0559
Umphress, E. E., Bingham, J. B., & Mitchell, M. S. (2010). Unethical behavior in the
name of the company: The moderating effect of organizational identification and
positive reciprocity beliefs on unethical pro-organizational behavior. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 95(4), 769-780. doi:10.1037/a0019214
Vadera, A. K., & Pratt, M. G. (2013). Love, hate, ambivalence, or indifference? A
conceptual examination of workplace crimes and organizational identification.
Organization Science, 24(1), 172-188.
Vardi, Y., & Wiener, Y. (1996). Misbehavior in organizations: A motivational
framework. Organization Science, 7(2), 151-165.
Verbeke, W., Ouwerkerk, C., & Peelen, E. (1996). Exploring the contextual and
individual factors on ethical decision making of salespeople. Journal of Business
Ethics, 15(11), 1175-1187.
Verma, P., & Mohapatra, S. (2015). Weak ideologies or strong identification: Decision
making in unethical pro-organizational behavior. Social Science Research
Network.

180

Victor, B., & Cullen, J. B. (1987). A theory and measure of ethical climate in
organizations. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 9(1), 5171.
Victor, B., & Cullen, J. B. (1988). The organizational bases of ethical work climates.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 101-125.
Warren, D. E. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. Academy
of Management Review, 28(4), 622-632.
Williams, L. J., Hartman, N., & Cavazotte, F. (2010). Method variance and marker
variables: A review and comprehensive CFA marker technique. Organizational
Research Methods, 13(3), 477-514.
Williams, L. J., & O’Boyle, E. H. (2015). Ideal, nonideal, and no-marker variables: The
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) marker technique works when it matters.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(5), 1579-1602. doi:10.1037/a0038855.

181

